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. Introduction
The debate played out in the pages of this symposium is a critical and
timely one. The ongoing effort by the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
to promulgate a rule to forbid circuit courts from prohibiting the citation of
unpublished opinions has unleashed a charged debate over the publication
practices of our federal courts of appeals.' Before wading into this controversy,
it is important to put it in context.
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Public Representation,
Georgetown University Law Center. We thank Samuel Alito, Scott Baker, Devon Carbado,
Paul Carrington, Stephen Choi, Kim Krawiec, Richard McKewen, and David Klein for
conversations about this topic. Thanks also to David Caudill and the students of the
Washington and Lee Law Review for organizing this conference.
** Visiting Professor, Duke Law School (2005-2006).
1. Professor Schiltz, the reporter for the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, has
described the drama over the proposed rule in two recent articles. See Patrick Schiltz, Much
Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang Over the Citation of Unpublished
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Over the past three decades, the dockets of our federal courts of appeals
have skyrocketed.2 To manage their burgeoning caseloads, courts have
increasingly resorted to docket-management tools that have resulted in a
bifurcation of how cases are considered and resolved by federal appeals courts.
This bifurcation appears to be complete. There are now two separate and
unequal tracks by which cases are considered and resolved in our federal
appellate courts. We call these Track One (or the "Learned Hand" track) and
Track Two (or the "black box" track).3
"Track One" cases bear all of the traditional hallmarks of our appellate
justice system. Each case is reviewed by three Article II judges; they read the
briefs, study the record, hear oral argument, and deliberate with their colleagues
to reach a decision. Each case is resolved in a carefully crafted opinion
identifying the author and the concurrence (or dissent) of the other participating
judges. In most courts, draft opinions are circulated to all judges to ensure
Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005) [hereinafter Schiltz, Explaining the Sturm Und
Drang] (questioning the controversy surrounding the proposed rule); see also Patrick Schiltz,
The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeal, 74 FORDHAM L. REv.
(forthcoming 2005). For other recent treatments of the controversy over citation rules, in
addition to the articles in this symposium and another recent one forthcoming in the Fordham
Law Review, see generally Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in
Federal Courts of Appeals, 29 VT. L. REv. 555 (2005); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of
Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004); Lauren Robel, The
Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an
Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REv. 399 (2002).
2. The number of cases brought before courts of appeals annually has jumped from
around 11,000 cases in 1970 to around 60,000 in 2002. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 76 tbl.4 (1996) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]
(charting the historical and projected appeals filed); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR 2002, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/cmsa2002.pl (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). Concerns about the exploding caseloads of the
federal courts are not new. See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, JUSTICE RESEARCH INST., RATIONING
JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 31-43 (1994)
(summarizing previous studies of increased appellate caseloads); DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE
COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME, 7-9 (1974) (discussing the radical
increase in volume of appellate caseloads).
3. The terms Track One and Track Two are not terms of art used by Court Process
Studies scholars. We use the terms as a shorthand way of summarizing the two paths that are
currently used by the courts of appeals to resolve cases on the merits. Others have used the
same terminology. See, e.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck
Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1290, 1291 (1996) [hereinafter Reynolds &
Richman, Studying Deck Chairs] (using Track-Two terminology to describe a "decision without
oral argument in a brief, unpublished opinion drafted by staff attorneys"); see also 1 THCIR. R.
34-3(a) (2001) ("The court maintains a two-calendar system for consideration and decision of
appeals in the interest of efficient and appropriate use ofjudicial resources, control of the docket
by the court, minimizing unnecessary expenditure of government funds, and lessening delay in
decisions.").
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consistency within the circuit. Only then is a published opinion formally
issued. There are few questions about accountability or transparency in the
handling of Track One cases. Losing lawyers and litigants maybe disappointed
with the result, but they can make no plausible claim that they were
shortchanged by the judicial process.
As caseloads have exploded and judges have delegated increasing
amounts of their tasks to their law clerks and other assistants, the validity of the
idealized model of appellate judging-sometimes dubbed the "Learned Hand
model"-and the resulting reasons for concern have become a frequent topic of
discussion among commentators studying court processes.4 Our contention in
this Article is that there exists a second set of cases for which the Learned Hand
model is not merely fraying at the edges. Instead, the traditional model has
been abandoned in these cases. This second set of cases warrants greater
attention from researchers. Track Two cases are disposed of in ways that
appear cursory. These cases are culled early in the appellate process
(sometimes even before briefing) for disposition without argument. Many are
processed by staff attorneys or court-employed legal assistants rather than
Article III judges. Although Article Ill judges oversee the process, review
recommendations, and ultimately "decide" the cases, our sense is that, in
general, judges do not read the briefs, review the record, or independently
research the law. Instead, they rely on staff assistants to provide them with both
an even-handed, balanced appraisal of the case and a proposed disposition.5
Although few statistics are available, evidence suggests that judges rarely
disagree with proposed dispositions.6 As a result, litigants and their lawyers
have no appreciable contact with the court, and no judge is personally
accountable for the court's disposition. Track Two cases are generally disposed
of in brief, unpublished, and unsigned opinions. The opinions are drained of
any precedential value by circuit rule and, in most circuits, are consigned to a
4. See, e.g., William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the
New Certiorari: Requiemfor the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273,299-300
(1996) [hereinafter Richman & Reynolds, New Certiorari] (discussing judicial opposition to
creating additional judgeships); Hon. Richard J. Cardamone, Foreword: How an Expanding
Caseload Impacts Federal Appellate Procedures, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 281, 281 (1999)
(reflecting on the features of appellate judging); JONATHAN MATrHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE
COURTS: THE IMPACT OF COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS 222 (2002) (expressing less concern about the effects of increased
loads and more confidence than other commentators about the abilities of the courts to adjust
effectively to the increased caseloads).
5. For a description of the role of staff attorneys in culling cases in the Ninth Circuit, see
J. Clifford Wallace, Improving the Appellate Process Worldwide Through Maximizing Judicial
Resources, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 187, 192, 197-98 (2005).
6. See infra note 122 (citing authorities).
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jurisprudential "Neverland," where litigants are either forbidden or discouraged
from citing them. Losing parties in these cases, we suspect, wonder whether
they have received second-class justice.7 Because the Track Two process is
largely invisible and poorly understood by litigants and their counsel, we
believe it is fair to dub it the "black box" process.
Were Track Two cases the exception rather than the rule, there would be
no controversy about the publication practices of our appellate courts. But they
are not the exception; they are the norm. At present, fewer than 20% of
appellate cases decided on the merits are resolved in written, published
opinions. And that percentage is dwindling.9
Not surprisingly, given that unpublished dispositions now comprise over
80% of the output of our appellate courts, few defend the practice by arguing
7. The history of the use of unpublished, nonprecedential, and uncitable opinions to
dispose of merits cases in the courts of appeals is catalogued in Penelope Pether, Inequitable
Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435,1442-
83 (2004). Professor Pether's account is in accord with that reported by other scholars. See,
e.g., David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1133, 1141-47 (2002) (chronicling the rise ofnonpublication policies). Much of the
scholarship in this area builds on the foundation laid by Professors William L. Reynolds and
William M. Richman in a trilogy of articles. See Richman & Reynolds, New Certiorari, supra
note 4, at 281-86 (noting the radical changes in federal circuit caseload over the past quarter
century; arguing that these changes, in effect, transform the circuit courts into courts of
certiorari; and discussing the negative effects of such changes, particularly on those with limited
resources); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation ofLimitedPublication
in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. Cn. L. REV. 573, 575-84
(1981) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform] (presenting an empirical assessment
of the publication plans of the eleven circuits during the 1978-1979 reporting year and
analyzing their effect on judicial productivity and responsibility); William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-LimitedPublication andNo-Citation
Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 1167, 1168-72 (1978)
[hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, Non-Precedential Precedent] (discussing the history of
citation and publication rules in the different circuit and "examining closely their content").
8. According to the most recent statistics made available to the public by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, for orders filed in cases terminated on the merits
during the twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2004, 81% were terminated in
unpublished opinions. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL Bus. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-3 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 JuDiCLAL BusIEss] (listing
the percentage of each circuit's dispositions made by unpublished opinions by circuit),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/tables/s3.pdf. There are, of course, a
substantial number of appeals that are dismissed for procedural reasons. See id. at tbl.B-5A
(listing data for procedural terminations such as jurisdictional defects, defaults, and certiorari
appealability), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b5a.pdf.
9. Compare id. at tbl.S-3 (reporting the percentage of unpublished opinions to be 81.0%
in 2004) with LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL Bus. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1998 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-3 (2004) (reporting the percentage of unpublished opinions to be
74.9% in 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/dirrpt 98/s03sep98.pdf.
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that Track Two cases are too insignificant to warrant greater attention. Based
on our experiences, we find it hard to imagine that anyone with even passing
familiarity with federal appellate practice would see the matter otherwise.'
Thus, to the extent that the practice can find defenders (and there are many,
including prominent court of appeals judges), it is justified mainly on the
grounds of necessity-that is, that our appellate courts are so overburdened that
judges cannot produce thoughtful, thorough, and well-reasoned opinions in
anything but a small fraction of the cases they review." The purpose of this
symposium was to bring together judges, academics, and practitioners to render
a normative judgment on the practice of appellate courts disposing of cases in
ways that, by definition, limit transparency and accountability. The task we
were assigned by the symposium organizers was to provide an overview of the
papers critiquing the restrictive publication practices of the circuit courts and to
address areas of possible reform. That task in mind, we focus our remarks on
three points.
First, like most of our symposium colleagues, we join the chorus of those
who contend that the practice of resolving the vast majority of appellate cases
in unpublished, nonprecedential, and uncitable opinions is a stain on our
appellate justice system.12 We are mindful of the workload burdens cited by
the defenders of the practice. Nonetheless, publication rules that forbid even
the citation of court opinions stifle the development of the law, fuel suspicions
that courts are not scrupulously obeying the rule of law, and give both judges
10. See, e.g., Hon. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP.
PRAC. & PRocEss 219, 224 (1999) ("Many cases with obvious legal importance are being
decided by unpublished opinions."); accord Hon. Danny J. Boggs & Brian P. Brooks,
Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 18-22 (2000) (stating
that "it seems clearly wrong to say that courts should decide whether or not to publish
opinions.., based on their perceived general 'precedential significance"' and noting that
"plenty of unpublished decisions have been accepted for review and reversed by the Supreme
Court").
11. See Wallace, supra note 5, at 189, 192 (stating that few parties are fortunate enough to
have their disputes resolved in "published, fully reasoned" decisions and noting that the "Ninth
Circuit might have collapsed under the weight of its ever-increasing caseload had it not
developed innovative ways to allocate its limited resources"); Alex Kozinski & Stephen
Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This! Why We Don 'tAllow Citation to Unpublished Opinions in
the Ninth Circuit, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43 (stating that writing an opinion is much more
time consuming than writing a "memorandum disposition," and noting that the Ninth Circuit
writes opinions in only 15% of cases and may have to reduce that number).
12. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1441 (stating that the practice of issuing unpublished
opinions "sacrifice[s] principled decisionmaking .... imperil[s] the legitimacy of the judicial
system, ... [and] corrupt[s] the operation of the courts and the administration of justice");
Richman & Reynolds, New Certiorari, supra note 4, at 275 (stating that the tradition of writing
a fully reasoned opinion for publication has been "sadly truncated," and opining that the
changes in the appellate court system have had "deplorable effects").
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and lawyers incentives to engage in strategic game-playing. 13 Even if judges
and lawyers refrain from engaging in this sort of strategic behavior-and there
is evidence to suggest that judges act strategically to further their goals at least
some of the time (that lawyers act strategically goes without saying) 14-the
opportunity for such abuse is reason enough to discontinue the practice.
Our second point flows from the first. This symposium has been myopic
in one key respect. It fails to engage the question of what causes the
unpublication problem; the focus has instead been on the symptoms of the
problem. Engaging the question of causes, however, is crucial if we are to
design solutions. If the cause of the unpublication problem is the
overburdening of judges, then the optimal solution is likely an increase in
judicial resources. If the problem is a function of judges failing to work hard
enough or focusing their energies on the wrong pool of cases, then the solution
may be to provide them with better or more finely tuned incentives to work
harder or smarter. Unfortunately, the empirical research to answer the
foregoing questions has not been done. Our sense, based on our experiences
with the courts, is that the key cause of the unpublication problem is the
caseload explosion-in other words, a resource problem. But even if we are
correct that the primary causal factor is a resource deficit, that does not mean
13. As we explain below, though we are troubled by the universal determination of the
circuits to label their unpublished decisions "non-precedential," our main concern goes to circuit
rules forbidding or discouraging even the citation of unpublished opinions. Many, but not all,
of our concerns about the current publication practices of the courts would be addressed by the
adoption of a rule, like that proposed by the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules of the
United States Judicial Conference, forbidding circuits from imposing and enforcing no-citation
prohibitions. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
14. Social scientists, particularly those in the fields of economics and political science,
have long argued that judges need to be understood as agents who behave strategically to further
their policy and other private goals. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a
Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583,584 (2001) (exploring whether judges vote
in accord with their political preferences); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrrTuDINAL MODEL REvISrrED 12-25 (2002) (outlining various
reasons behind judicial policymaking); Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Decisionmaking: Attitudes
About Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1734-63 (2003) (reviewing Segal and Spaeth's
revised attitudinal model, discussed supra, and suggesting future research to perfect the model);
FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SuPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 149
(2000) (concluding that preferences alone do not dictate the choices Supreme Court Justices
make, but stating that their decisions do result from the "pursuit of their policy preferences
within constraints endogenous the Court"). Indeed, the model of judges as strategic actors
seeking to further policy goals has become so dominant in political science that it has sparked a
pushback from some scholars asserting that judges do also care about process values and
deciding cases consistently with what they perceive to be "law." See e.g., DAVID E. KLEIN,
MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL 138 (2002) ("A far more interesting
implication of the study is that legal goals, too, have a real effect on judges' decisions.").
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that existing judicial incentives should not be fine-tuned in order to improve
judicial performance.15
For purposes of our comments, we assume that the reason for the
unpublication crisis is that the federal circuit courts are overburdened (in other
words, we will put aside the question of fine-tuning judicial incentives).
Judges' workloads have grown exponentially while the number of judges has
remained relatively static. As a consequence, courts are so overwhelmed that
they are engaged in judicial triage. To cope with workload constraints, courts
have implemented a tracked system that gives the closest judicial attention to
those cases that warrant it because of their likely precedential value; that
relegates the remaining cases (those that appear to be "routine" in that they
involve the application of settled law to the facts of the case) to judicial
assistants, whom the judges supervise. As noted, current court of appeals
judges have the time to give full judicial attention, including hearing argument
and preparing signed opinions, to only about 20% of their cases.
16
The debate over publication and citation practices will not ebb until the
root problem of the workload of our appellate courts is better understood and
addressed. Unless structural changes are made to address the growing burden
on the courts of appeals, the prospects of real reform are a mirage. As
caseloads rise, an ever-smaller percentage of cases will be decided by published
opinions. And the time may soon come when published, precedential opinions
are a statistical anomaly.17 That prospect is daunting. It is time to pay as much
15. Although there is not a large volume of literature on the topic, the existing research
suggests that judges, like the rest of us, do respond to incentives. See Russell Smyth, Do Judges
Behave as Homo Economicus and, If So, Can We Measure Their Performance? An Antipodean
Perspective on a Tournament of Judges, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1299 (2005). For suggestions
as to incentive systems, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEx. L. REv. 431, 458-87
(2004) (discussing impeachment, recusal, disqualification, mandamus, liability, discipline
procedures, electoral reforms, executive appointments, quality ratings, peremptory challenges,
and panel exclusion).
16. Judge Posner has noted:
Given the workload of the federal courts of appeals today, the realistic choice is not
between limited publication, on the one hand, and, on the other, improving and
then publishing all the opinions that are not published today; it is between
preparing but not publishing opinions in many cases and preparing no opinions in
those cases. It is a choice, in other words, between giving the parties reasons for
the decision of their appeal and not giving them reasons even though the appeal is
not frivolous.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 168-69 (1996); see also
Hon. Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 196
(1999) (arguing that limited citation is a "de facto cap on any precedential value an unpublished
opinion might have").
17. Any doubt about this acceleration in the percentage of cases disposed of in
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attention to the workload problem that lies at the core of this debate as we
do to the symptoms of publication practices.
This brings us to our third point. The seismic shift in the way courts
of appeals consider and decide cases raises questions for the judiciary. For
one thing, there are many embedded questions of procedure and structure
that should be, but have not been, addressed. For instance, at present, 80%
of federal appellate cases are disposed of in a "black box" process that is all
but invisible to outsiders. Should courts be more transparent and openly
acknowledge that we now have two distinct and very different tiers of
appellate justice in the United States? Is it right that judges now heavily
rely on staff counsel and other judicial assistants to do the heavy lifting in
deciding cases? As some circuits acknowledge, the behind-the-scenes
judicial work in these Track Two, black box cases is being done in the
main by an army of law clerks, staff counsel, and other judicial assistants,
with varying degrees of oversight by Article III judges. Should we move to
a system that acknowledges explicitly the limited, supervisory role judges
play in the disposition of these cases? Should we require that the names of
the staff attorneys and other secondary staff who do the primary work on
these opinions appear publicly, at least as secondary authors?
Perhaps a more critical inquiry is whether the burdens on appellate
courts have reached the point where Congress should consider structural
changes?' 8  Should Congress consider whether to authorize the
unpublished opinions should be dispelled by the statistics. In 1979, when Professors Reynolds
and Richman finished the first study of circuit publication practices, they found that the courts
of appeals were publishing 38.3% of their opinions. Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform,
supra note 7, at 587. Twenty-five years later, the percentage of opinions that are published has
fallen to half of that number (19%). LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES: MULTI-YEAR STATISTICAL COMPILATION OF FEDERAL
COURT CASELOAD THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2004 tbl. 1.6 (2005) [hereinafter JUDICIAL FACTS AND
FIGURES], available at www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/alljffiables.pdf.
18. Because they are far afield from the focus of this symposium, we put aside structural
modifications fraught with political implications but not directly relevant to publication
practices, such as increasing substantially the number of Article III appellate judges, limiting the
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, or creating specialized courts to handle appeals in cases
raising certain statutory claims.
Even as we suggest structural reforms to the court system, we note that calls for major
structural reforms to the court system have been made by commentators and committees at least
since the late 1960s-many of them expressing concerns deriving from the workload-but those
reform proposals have fallen on deaf ears. See Paul D. Carrington, Checks and Balances:
Congress and the Judiciary n. 183 (unpublished draft, on file with the Washington & Lee Law
Review); Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, andLife
Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579,602-05 (2005) (noting that the rising demand for adjudication
has changed the context in which judging takes place and requires that the methods for choosing
judges be increased).
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appointment of "appellate" magistrate judges who could assist the court and
hear cases in which the parties agree to a reference to magistrate judges (as
happens in the district courts)? Or perhaps courts could direct that
"routine" cases be considered in the first instance by appellate magistrate
judges? Such an approach could relieve some of the caseload pressures on
Article III judges, avert calls for dramatically expanding the corps of
Article III appellate judges, ensure that cases are resolved in an open and
transparent way, and avoid the confirmation battles that often mark the
appointment of circuit judges.
There are also questions of outcomes. We start with the understanding
that the professional staff attorneys who review and propose these
dispositions are competent, committed to justice, and dedicated to ensuring
that all litigants get a fair hearing. And we recognize that the premise of
this system is that the use of staff attorneys to assist the court should not
affect outcomes. But is that so? We know little about staff attorneys and
other judicial assistants and how they perform their work. Is it not time
that changed? If judges are going to delegate increasing amounts of
responsibility to these secondary actors, should they not correspondingly
reveal greater amounts of information about the involvement of these
actors? These disclosures would produce at least some measure of
accountability; they would enable researchers to test claims, for example,
that these secondary actors do a good job, are unbiased in their
dispositions, are adequately supervised, and are not subject to conflicts of
interest.
There is a separate issue, with regard to outcomes, that should be
addressed as well: Most cases decided without argument in unpublished
and non-citable opinions affirm lower court rulings. 19 Does the high
affirmance rate demonstrate that the system works, as it effectively screens
out those cases that do not require the close attention ofjudges because the
disposition below is so clearly correct? There are two less benign
explanations: 1) the affirmance rate is high because staff attorneys have
heavy caseloads and may not see an error in the disposition below unless
the error is glaring; or 2) there exists a self-serving default rule to affirm
because otherwise there would be more work, which would require the
commitment of scarce judicial resources. These possibilities need to be
considered, yet thus far, they have not been systematically explored.2°
19. See infra note 133 (providing statistics of summarily dismissed cases by the Second,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals).
20. For a recent treatment of the question of why affirmance rates are so high in the
federal circuit courts, see generally Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, The Futility of Appeal:
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II. The Problems with Unpublished, Nonprecedential, and
Uncitable Opinions
The rising tide of unpublished, nonprecedential, and often uncitable
dispositions in appellate cases is a cause of concern. Courts administer
justice. The sine qua non of justice is the transparent and consistent
administration of the rule of law. If like cases are not decided in a like
manner in an open and public process, it is a danger signal that perhaps
justice is not being done. 21 And if courts conceal their dispositions from
litigants, or forbid litigants from relying on them or even citing them, it
suggests that the "danger signal" may not be a false alarm. We recognize,
and address in Part II, the severe resource limitations facing the appellate
courts. But resource limitations, no matter how severe, cannot justify the
imposition of strict rules that forbid even the citation of opinions issued by
federal courts-even if the court deems the opinion unworthy of citation.
Here, we want to emphasize that our objection, and indeed the
objection of most of the critics of contemporary publication restrictions,
principally goes to the prohibitions on citation. At present, four
circuits-the Second,22 Seventh,23 Ninth,24 and Federal Circuits
25
-
impose outright prohibitions on the citation of unpublished opinions
(except in related cases). Five other circuits-the Fourth,26
Disciplinary Insights into the "Affirmance Effect" on the US. Courts ofAppeals, 32 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 357 (2005). Unfortunately, for our purposes, George and Guthrie, while noting that the
affirmance rates for unpublished opinions are significantly higher than those for published
opinions, do not explore the causal reasons for this difference. See id. at 362 (noting only that
"we can infer that [the affirmance rate of unpublished opinions] is much higher" but failing to
offer causal reasons).
21. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 595-602 (1987)
(discussing the virtue of precedential constraint).
22. See 2D CiR. R. 0.23 ("Since these statements [in unpublished opinions] do not
constitute formal opinions of the court and are unreported or not uniformly available to all
parties, they shall not be cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this or any other
court."); FED. CiR. R. 47.6 ("Any opinion or order so designated [as nonprecedential] must not
be employed or cited as precedent.").
23. See 7TH CR. R. 53(e) (stating that unless used to support a claim of res judicata or
claim preclusion, "no unpublished opinion or order of any court may be cited in the Seventh
Circuit if citation is prohibited in the rendering court").
24. See 9TH CR. R. 36-3(b) (stating that "[u]npublished dispositions and orders of this
Court may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except" in circumstances going to issue
or claim preclusion, for factual purposes (double jeopardy), or in a request for publication).
25. See FED. CR. R. 47.6 ("Any opinion or order so designated [as nonprecedential] must
not be employed or cited as precedent.").
26. See 4TH CiR. R. 36(c) (stating that citation of unpublished opinions is "disfavored,
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Fifth,27 Sixth,2 8 Eighth, 29 and Tenth30 Circuits-affirmatively discourage
citation of unpublished opinions by saying that their citation is "disfavored" or
that unpublished opinions should not "generally" or "normally" be cited
because they carry no precedential weight. Only four circuits-the First,3 1
Third,32 Eleventh,33 and D.C. 34 Circuits-neither prohibit nor openly
discourage the citation of unpublished opinions, although each of these circuits,
like their sister circuits, admonish litigants that unpublished opinions have no
precedential value.
The firestorm over circuit court publication practices was ignited by an
August 2003 proposal by the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules of the
United States Judicial Conference Committee. 5 The Committee proposed to
amend the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure by adding a new provision,
Rule 32.1, that would bar the courts of appeals from enacting rules forbidding
the citation of unpublished opinions for their persuasive value or for any other
reason.36 Nothing in the proposed rule would force the circuits to abandon their
uniform position that "unpublished" opinions are nonprecedential.37
except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case").
27. See 5TH CR. R. 47.5.3 ("[A]n unpublished opinion should normally be cited only
when the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case is applicable.").
28. See 6H CR. R. 28(g) (stating that citation of unpublished opinions is "disfavored,
except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case").
29. See 8TH CiR. R. 28A(i) ("Unpublished opinions ... are not precedent and parties
generally should not cite them.").
30. See 10TH CIR. R. 36.3(B) ("Citation of an unpublished decision is disfavored.").
31. See 1ST CR. R. 36(c) (stating that "a panel's decision to issue an unpublished opinion
means that the panel sees no precedential value in that opinion").
32. See 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.7 (stating that unpublished "opinions are not regarded as
precedents that bind the court because they do not circulate to the full court before filing").
33. Seel TH CIR. R. 36-2 (stating that "unpublished opinions are not considered binding
precedent").
34. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2) (stating that "a panel's decision to issue an unpublished
disposition means that the panel sees no precedential value in that disposition"). Although the
D.C. Circuit does not forbid citation of its unpublished opinions, it does not post them on its
website, making it difficult for litigants and researchers to find these opinions. The court does
permit the publication of its nonprecedential opinions in the Federal Appendix. See, e.g.,
Westine v. Sawyer, 48 Fed. Appx. 794 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per curium) (appearing in the Federal
Appendix despite nonprecedential status).
35. For a summary of the comments received, see generally Memorandum from Patrick J.
Schiltz, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, to Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules (Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Schiltz Memorandum] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See id. at 30 (setting forth the complete text of proposed Rule 32.1).
37. See id. (stating that circuits may not restrict or forbid citation to unpublished opinions
but failing to address the precedential value of such opinions).
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Nonetheless, the Committee's Reporter, Professor Patrick Schiltz of St.
Thomas Law School, remarked at a Committee hearing that the proposal is
"very controversial, and rules that are very controversial rarely take the quickest
path. 38 As is detailed in Professor Schiltz's contribution to this symposium,
he, if anything, underestimated the intensity of the opposition to the proposal,
spearheaded by court of appeals judges, especially those in the Ninth Circuit.39
Even though the Advisory Committee voted seven to two in favor of the
amendment at its April 2004 meeting, the Committee's action was greeted with
intense objection from circuit judges. Because of the opposition, the
Committee agreed to put off further consideration of the issue pending a
thorough study by the Federal Judicial Center of the objections. The Center
issued a preliminary report on April 14, 2005, concluding that the proposed
rule would not have the adverse effects on judicial efficiency critics feared.41
On the basis of the report, in April 2005, the Committee once again voted
seven to two to approve the proposed rule.42 In June 2005, the Committee on
Rules and Practice of U.S. Courts (commonly referred to as the "Standing
Committee") voted to approve the amendment as well.
That, of course, is not the end of the process. Under the Rules Enabling
Acts,43 the amendment must surmount numerous hurdles before it can take
effect. One hurdle, approval by the Judicial Conference of the United States,
was overcome at the Conference's meeting on September 20, 2005.44 The next
step in the process is referral to the Supreme Court, which has the statutory
authority to prescribe rules of procedure for the federal courts.45 Assuming
38. Pether, supra note 7, at 1471 (quoting Stephanie Francis Cahill, Don't Issue
Citations for Citations, A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Dec. 13, 2002, available at I No. 47 ABAJEREP
1 (Westlaw)).
39. See Schiltz Memorandum, supra note 35, at 1 (stating that approximately 80% of
the comments opposed to proposed Rule 32.1 were received from judges, clerks, and lawyers
in the Ninth Circuit).
40. See id. at 89 (reporting the vote); see also How Appealing, http://legalaffairs.org/
howappealing/ (Apr. 14, 2004, 16:04 EST) (noting the action taken by the Committee).
41. TIM REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITATIONS TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: PRELIMINARY REPORT (2005) [hereinafter FJC
PRELIMINARY REPORT], available at http://www.fc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Citatio2.pdf/$
File/Citatio2.pdf.
42. See Draft Minutes of the Spring 2005 Meeting of the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules (Apr. 18, 2005), available at http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/Appellate
RulesCmteApr2005DraftMinutes.pdf.
43. Rules Enabling Acts, 8 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2075, 2077 (2000).
44. Judicial Conference Approves Rule Changes on E-Discovery, Unpublished Opinion
Citation, 74 U.S.L.W. 2168 (Sept. 27, 2005).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000) ("The Supreme Court shall have the power to
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Supreme Court approval, the amendment then must survive a "report and wait"
procedure that gives Congress at least seven months to reject, modify, or defer
the amendment.46 Even if the road ahead is clear for passage of the
amendment, the earliest it can take effect is December 1, 2006.47 It remains to
be seen, however, whether the fierce judicial opposition that delayed the
Advisory Committee's action on the proposal will place additional roadblocks
in the amendment's path.48
Meanwhile, the academic community has long criticized the restrictive
publication practices of appellate courts, and the criticism intensified once the
Committee issued its proposal.49 These scholars contend that, in Track Two
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts... and courts of appeals."). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2073, advisory
committees forward their recommendations to the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, commonly referred to as the Standing Committee. See id. § 2073(b) (2000) (stating
that "[s]uch standing committee shall review each recommendation of any other committee so
appointed"). The Standing Committee meets to determine whether to approve proposed
amendments to the rules. See id. (stating that the "standing committee shall... recommend to
the Judicial Conference rules of practice, procedure, and evidence and such changes in rules
proposed by a committee"). Amendments that are approved, with or without revision, are then
sent to the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id. If approved by the Conference, the
amendments are transmitted to the Supreme Court, which has the authority to prescribe the
federal rules, subject to a statutory waiting period. See id. § 2074 (2000) ("The Supreme Court
shall transmit to the Congress not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule prescribed under
section 2072 is to become effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no
earlier than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless otherwise
provided by law."). In other words, amendments approved by the Supreme Court are then
transmitted to Congress by May 1 under a "report and wait" procedure that provides that if
Congress does not enact legislation to reject, modify or defer the rules, the amendments take
effect on December 1. For a detailed discussion of this process, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THEU.S.
CouRTs, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2004),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/procedure sum.htm.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000) (describing "report and wait" procedures).
47. See id. (establishing a timeline for congressional approval).
48. Before the Rules Committee made its proposal, this battle was also played out in the
courts, with both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits entertaining claims that restrictions on
publication and citation violated the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit initially held its
noncitation rule unconstitutional. See Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 905 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding unconstitutional an Eighth Circuit rule that provided that an opinion marked
unpublished is not precedent). However, it later vacated that opinion as moot. See Anastasoff
v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that constitutionality of the
noncitation rule is an open question because an earlier opinion conceming the rule was vacated
for mootness). The Ninth Circuit found its noncitation rule constitutional. See Hart v.
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that 9TH CIR. R. 36-3, which
declares that unpublished opinions are not binding precedent and are not to be cited in briefs
before the court, is constitutional).
49. There are some commentators who think that critics overstate the problem of
unpublished opinions and the potential for judicial misbehavior. See, e.g., Stephen L. Wasby,
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cases, the courts have largely abandoned the cornerstones of appellate decision-
making: full consideration of all issues raised on appeal, adequate oral
argument and briefing opportunities, well-reasoned published dispositions, and
direct involvement of Article III judges in every stage of the process.50 Critics
argue-and we largely agree-that in abandoning these safeguards the courts
have (1) created "secret law" or at least inaccessible law, (2) unleashed a
corresponding erosion ofjudicial precedent as a foundation of the common law,
(3) sacrificed the quality of judicial analysis in not-for-publication cases,
(4) undermined the accountability of appellate courts to the bar and the public,
and (5) engaged in a host of First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal
Protection violations by barring citation.5 1
We will not repeat those objections in detail here. We write to emphasize
concerns about accountability that have not been explained fully in the past or
do not stand out in more far-reaching attacks on citation and publication
restrictions. In our view, the signal defect in the practice of disposing of cases
in unpublished, nonprecedential opinions is that it provides incentives for
strategic game-playing by appellate courts and sophisticated appellate lawyers,
and that fact alone counsels against the practice. We will begin with the courts.
A. The Courts and Strategic Behavior
To us, the main vice of noncitation rules is that they allow courts to
engage in ad hoc decision-making and avoid accountability for so doing. The
widespread use of unpublished, nonprecedential opinions provides incentives to
appellate judges to insulate from en banc and Supreme Court review decisions
that are controversial, unpopular, deviate from or even conflict with circuit
precedent, or are inconsistent with the judge's ideological views. In other
Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeal: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 336 (2001) (suggesting that the proper use of guidelines for when
and when not to publish tempers much of the criticism of the decision not to publish an
opinion); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Court of Appeals Decisions: A
Hard Look at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INrERDISC. L.J. 67, 123-24 (2004) (arguing that the
process through which an opinion becomes unpublished answers many of the objections of
critics of nonpublication). However, our impression is that they are few in number.
50. For a discussion, see generally other pieces in this Symposium.
51. See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, New Certiorari, supra note 4, at 281-86 (describing
the important functions that published opinions perform and the corresponding negative
consequences of nonpublication); Pether, supra note 7, at 1483-1528 (arguing that
nonpublication creates more problems than it solves); Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 7, at
1155-59 (arguing that "the exposition and refinement of the law that occur through the issuance
of reasoned opinions have significant and potentially long-lasting public benefits").
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words, the rules remove an important check on Article III appellate judges who
are subject to few meaningful constraints on their power. A key assumption
that we make here, as does almost everyone else at this symposium, is that
precedent actually constrains judges.52 If, however, precedent does not impose
meaningful constraints on judges-as an extreme realist position would
suggest-then all of this chest beating over the designation of opinions as
citable or uncitable is beside the point.
The extreme realist position aside, there is little question that unpublished
decisions are largely immune from further review. After all, at least in theory,
these opinions are not published, and hence are not precedential, because they
are routine dispositions that do not "make" law.53 So we begin with the strong
52. Our political science colleague, David Klein, points out in his contribution to the
symposium that before we expend great energy arguing over whether judges are appropriately
designating opinions as citable or not (roughly translating into precedential or not), it is
important to determine whether judges are actually constrained by precedent. See David E.
Klein, Unspoken Questions in the Rule 32.1 Debate: Precedent and Psychology in Judging, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1709, 1713-15 (2005) (discussing how much and why judges actually
rely on nonbinding precedent).
53. This justification does not hold water for us, even though the lack of meaningful
empirical testing of the matter has meant that the debate has been largely conducted with
reference to anecdotal evidence. That said, even appellate judges have recognized that more
than a few unpublished decisions address important questions of law. See, e.g., Arnold, supra
note 10, at 224 (stating that "many cases with obvious legal importance are being decided by
unpublished opinions"); Boggs & Brooks, supra note 10, at 18-22 (arguing that even cases that
do not create new legal rules often involve important legal issues in the application of old rules).
Moreover, as the FJC Preliminary Report confirms, judges feel unconstrained by noncitation
rules they have imposed on counsel and routinely cite unpublished opinions in both published
and nonpublished opinions. FJC PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 41, at 3-10 (surveying the
opinion ofjudges concerning unpublished opinions). Finally, as we point out infra, although
the Supreme Court rarely reviews unpublished rulings, a number of exceptionally important
Supreme Court cases came from unpublished circuit court decisions. See Michael Harmon, A
CloserLook at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 199, 230-31 (2001) (discussing Supreme Court cases that arose out of unpublished
opinions). These cases include an important decision on the scope of the Copyright Act, see
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991) (holding that a
telephone directory did not meet the constitutional or statutory requirements for copyright
protection); a pivotal case examining the First Amendment rights of public employees, see
Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that the discharge of a former district
attorney did not violate the attorney's constitutionally protected right of free speech); a seminal
case on the tax-exempt status of charitable organizations engaged in race discrimination, see
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 749 (1974) (holding that revocation of tax-exempt
status did not necessarily infringe the constitutionally protected free exercise of religion by the
institution); and a landmark Free Exercise Clause case, see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993) (holding that ordinance that prohibited
ritual slaughter of animals did not serve a government interest that justified the targeting of
religious activity). As Professor Harmon points out, it is hard to see how any of these cases
could have been deemed "routine" or to involve the application of "settled law" to the particular
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presumption that cases decided without a published opinion are far too
unimportant to command the attention of a full en banc court, let alone the
Supreme Court.
Possible en banc review is all but precluded by an array of circuit and
appellate rules. First, as noted above, every circuit has enacted a local rule that
explicitly states that unpublished opinions are not precedential.54 Because
unpublished decisions have no legal consequence (except their impact on the
parties), it is hard to imagine a court of appeals expending the considerable
resources required by en banc review to reconsider a legally inconsequential
decision. Second, several circuits acknowledge what we suspect is a
widespread practice: in contrast to published opinions, unpublished opinions
are not circulated to all of the circuit's judges in advance of issuance to ensure
consistency with circuit law.55 As a result, the other circuit judges are not
systematically made aware of unpublished decisions, and there is no formal
mechanism by which the judges of a circuit provide a check on their colleagues.
Third, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and local rules enacted by the
circuits, make clear that en banc review is disfavored and available only when
such consideration "is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's
decisions," or "the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
5 6
facts of the case. See Hannon, supra, at 225-26 (noting that nonpublication of opinions may
hide important circuit splits on key legal issues).
For a treatment of the limited literature on court compliance with internal rules regarding
the designation of opinions for publication, see David Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: An
Empirical Investigation of Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U.
CN. L. REv. 817, 824-25 (2005) (noting that while some (but not all) of the early studies on
publication practices in the 1970s concluded that courts were largely following their own
publication rules, recent research points in the other direction). The classic empirical work in
political science on publication practices and compliance with internal court rules was done by
Professor Songer. See, e.g., Donald Songer, Criteria for Publication in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 311 (1990) (finding
significant variance between the formal rules and indications from actual practice).
54. Supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.5.4 (acknowledging that "[dirafts of unanimous not
precedential opinions do not circulate to non-panel judges"); 6TH CiR. I.O.P. 206 (stating that
"all judges receive copies of any proposedpublishedopinions") (emphasis added). But see D.C.
CIR. R. 36(c)(1) ("An opinion.., which does not satisfy any of the criteria for publication...
will nonetheless be circulated to all judges on the court prior to issuance.").
56. FED. R. App. P. 35(a); see also IsT Cut. R. 35 ("Rehearing en banc shall be ordered
only upon the affirmative votes of a majority of the judges of this court in regular active
service."); 3RD CIR. R. 3.4 ("Counsel are reminded that in every case the duty of counsel is fully
discharged without filing a suggestion for rehearing en banc unless the case meets the rigorous
requirements of FRAP 35."); 4TH CIR. R. 36(a) ("A judge may file a published opinion without
obtaining all acknowledgments [of all other members of the Court] only if the opinion has been
in circulation for ten calendar days."); 5TH CIR. R. 35.1 ("Each request for en banc consideration
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No case decided in an unpublished opinion can meet these criteria.
Unpublished decisions are by definition nonprecedential, and thus they play no
role in securing or maintaining the uniformity of the court's decisions (which,
critics point out, is precisely the problem).57 And because the designation
"unpublished" signifies that the opinion addresses matters of unexceptional
importance, that criterion too can rarely, if ever, be met. We are unaware of
any study that systematically looks at the extent to which unpublished opinions
have merited en banc review, but we suspect that such review is a rarity or, in
some circuits, nonexistent.
5 8
must be studied by every active judge of the court and is a serious call on limited judicial
resources."); 7TH CIR. R. 53(d)(2) ("Notwithstanding the right of a single federal judge to make
an opinion available for publication, it is expected that a single judge will ordinarily respect and
abide by the opinion of the majority in determining whether to publish."); 8TH Cm. R. 35A ("The
court may assess costs against counsel who files a frivolous petition for rehearing en banc
deemed to have multiplied the proceedings in the case and to have increased costs unreasonably
and vexatiously.").
57. See FJC PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 41, at 87 (presenting a Ninth Circuit
judge's reasons for favoring the retention of the noncitation rule). The judge stated:
Often we do not call a case for a vote for a rehearing en banc because, although
wrongly decided by the panel, it does not involve Rule 35 and Rule 40 issues [cases
presenting unsettled questions of law]. And it will only affect the parties. If all
memorandum dispositions are to be cited, the number of en banc calls will surely
rise.
Id.
58. To test this theory, we examined the en banc rulings of the Third, Seventh, and D.C.
Circuits from January 1, 1997, to June 1, 2005, and found no en banc ruling issued by either the
Seventh or D.C. Circuit that reviewed an unpublished panel ruling. During the same time
period, three Third Circuit en banc rulings overturned unpublished panel opinions. See DeHart
v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 61 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that an inmate's "sincerity and the religious
nature of his dietary request establishes that he has a constitutionally protected interest"); Coss
v. Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney, 204 F.3d 453,467 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding "no parallel
between the case at bar and those cases where courts have determined that states should be
entitled to retry the petitioner"); United States v. Askari, 159 F.3d 774, 780 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that the best course, "in light of the sharp disagreements... over the meaning of a
number of still relevant terms, is to remand to the district court so that it can resentence in light
of the Amended [Sentencing] Guideline"). In Horn, the en banc court vacated an unpublished
panel decision, DeHart v. Horn, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 114 (3d Cir. Jan. 3, 2000), that upheld
the dismissal of a prisoner's claim that prison officials had unconstitutionally interfered with his
right to practice his religion. See Horn, 227 F.3d at 61 (reversing the district court). In Coss,
the en banc court vacated an unpublished panel decision, Coss v. Lackawanna County Dist.
Attorney, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 14209 (3d Cir. June 28, 1999), and upheld the district court's
denial of habeas relief. See Coss, 204 F.3d at 467 (remanding to the district court with
instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus). The Supreme Court later reversed the Third
Circuit. See Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394,408 (2001) (reversing
the lower court). And in Askari, the court reheard the case en banc because a member of the
initial panel called for en banc rehearing, pointing out that Third Circuit law was in conflict with
the law in other circuits. See Askari, 159 F.3d at 780 ("The district court deserves another
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The possibility of Supreme Court review is also exceedingly remote-
even more remote than usual. According to one study, the Supreme Court
reviewed unpublished opinions only twelve times between 1974, when the
practice of using unpublished opinions began in earnest,59 and the end of the
October Term of 2000--in other words, fewer than one case every other
Term. 60  Though it appears that the Court may be starting to review
unpublished decisions with somewhat greater frequency, it is still more likely
that unpublished decisions will not be reviewed.61
We recognize that although unpublished opinions are, as a practical
matter, insulated from further judicial review, this does not mean that courts
use unpublished opinions for strategic or improper purposes. But there are
ample grounds for concern. For one thing, a number ofjudges have suggested
that unpublished opinions are breeding grounds for abuse. For example, former
Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Judge Patricia Wald candidly observed that:
A double-track system allows for deviousness and abuse. I have seen
judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decision incorporating an
agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming public debate about
what law controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go along with
a result they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent. We do
occasionally sweep troublesome issues under the rug, though most will not
stay put for long.
6?
opportunity to make this determination.").
59. See Reynolds & Richman, Price of Reform, supra note 7, at 574 (studying circuit
publication practices).
60. See Hannon, supra note 53, at 230-31 (listing the twelve cases).
61. It appears that during the 2001-2004 Supreme Court Terms, the Court heard twelve
cases that had been decided by federal courts of appeals in unpublished opinions. In the
October Term of 2001, the Court heard Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation System, Inc.,
535 U.S. 826 (2002), and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002). In the October Term
of 2002, the Court heard Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23
(2003); Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003); Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522
(2003); and Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003). In the October Term of 2003,
the Court heard Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (2004); United States v. Flores-Montano,
541 U.S. 149 (2004); Muhammadv. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004); andBanks v. Dretke, 540 U.S.
668 (2004). And in the October Term of 2004, the Court heard Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct.
1807 (2004), and Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
62. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1374 (1995). Judge Wald, however, saw no option but to
continue the practice of issuing nonprecedential opinions. As she put it, "Time does not allow
for the same careful, thoughtful analysis and writing to be poured into all cases." Id. For further
support for the proposition that the use of unpublished opinions leads to strategic behavior by
judges, see Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REv. 71, 97-103 (2001)
(discussing the "charge that unpublished opinions allow judges to engage in strategic behavior"
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For another, there are a number of cases resolved by unpublished opinion that
so clearly merit full treatment by a court that one must wonder whether, to
borrow Judge Wald's phrase, the court swept "troublesome issues under the
rug." Consider three examples.
First, the Supreme Court made precisely this observation in United States
v. Edge Broadcasting Company,63 one of the most important cases decided
under the "commercial speech" doctrine. In Edge Broadcasting, the Court, in a
highly fractured series of opinions, reversed a Fourth Circuit unpublished
ruling affirming a district court decision striking down, on First Amendment
grounds, a federal statute prohibiting the broadcast of lottery advertisements
except by stations licensed to broadcast in states that conduct lotteries.64 As the
Court put it, "[w]e deem it remarkable and unusual that although the Court of
Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress was unconstitutional as
applied, the court found it appropriate to announce its judgment in an
unpublished per curiam opinion."'6 The complexity of the issue in Edge
Broadcasting is underscored by the fact that the Court has more recently
addressed and upheld First Amendment challenges to a related statute that
broadly prohibited the broadcast advertising of lotteries and casino gambling.66
Consider next the Fifth Circuit's unpublished disposition in Smith v.
67Crystian, a multimillion dollar class action settlement that resolved disputed
equitable and damage claims based on allegations that the defendant had
engaged in predatory lending practices. 68 Although the lawsuit sought both
money damages and equitable relief, the district court certified the class under
Rule 23 (b)(1)(A), which provides for mandatory, non-opt-out class certification
and citing supporting and opposing authorities); Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 7, at 1135
(noting that "practitioners harbor suspicions that noncitable opinions are used to paper over
poorly reasoned, result-driven outcomes"). See generally Reynolds & Richman, Studying Deck
Chairs, supra note 3, at 1291 (defining track-two justice as "decision without oral argument in a
brief, unpublished opinion drafted by staff attorneys"); Richman & Reynolds, New Certiorari,
supra note 4, at 278 (reviewing circuit court "shortcuts to decision making").
63. See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418,425 n.3 (1993) (noting that the
lower court applied questionable reasoning and expressing surprise that the court of appeals
would affirm the unconstitutionality of a federal statute in an unpublished opinion).
64. See id. at 436 (reversing the judgment of the court of appeals because the challenged
statute did "not violate the First Amendment").
65. Id. at 425 n.3.
66. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195-96 (1999)
(unanimously striking down federal law forbidding the broadcast advertising of lotteries and
casino gambling where such gambling was legal).
67. Smith v. Crystian, 91 Fed. Appx. 952 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 972
(2005).
68. See id. at 956 (affirming the district court's approval of the settlement agreement).
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when "inconsistent or varying adjudications.. . would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class., 6 9 Certification under
this provision of Rule 23 is rare because the blanket denial of opt-out rights
raises thorny due process questions, especially where the class is seeking
money damages. 70 A closely related problem arises with some frequency in
cases certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which permits certification in cases seeking
class-wide injunctive relief. Classes certified under Rule 23(b)(2) often
dispense with the actual notice and opt-out rights that are generally required
when money damages are sought. Permitting non-opt-out class actions to be
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) when the relief sought takes the form of both
money damages and injunctive relief is controversial, raising due process
questions.7' The Supreme Court has twice granted review in cases presenting
those questions, but each time it dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.72
And the circuit courts have reached a variety of conflicting conclusions about
the scope of a class member's due process right to opt out of classes when the
remedies sought include both money damages and injunctive relief under Rule
23(b)(2). 7
69. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
70. See generally Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999) (stating that "the
policy of avoiding serious constitutional issues" counsels against applying Rule 23(b)).
71. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,811-12 (1985) (holding that
absent class members seeking "wholly or predominantly" money judgments must be provided
notice, adequate representation, and the opportunity to opt out of the class).
72. See Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83,92 (1997) (citing an interest in comity and the
value of a fully developed factual and legal record as justifications for dismissing the writ as
improvidently granted); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1994) (dismissing
the writ as improvidently granted because it was not clear that resolving the constitutional
question would "make any difference even to these litigants").
73. See Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class Actions in the New Millennium
and the Blurring of Categorical Imperatives, 2003 U. Clu. LEGAL F. 177, 207 (stating that the
courts of appeals are "all over the map concerning what due process requires for mandatory
classes"). The Ninth Circuit requires that opt-out rights be provided to any class members
seeking substantial damages even when the class also claims injunctive relief. See e.g., Brown
v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 392, 396 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that due process requires the
provision of opt-out rights to any class members seeking substantial damages when the class
also claimed injunctive relief), cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 117 (1994); Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d
937, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2003) ("In recent cases, we have indicated that certification of a
mandatory class may be appropriate even when monetary damages are involved."). The Seventh
Circuit has gone further than the Ninth, requiring opt-out rights "whenever possible." Jefferson
v. Ingersoll Int'l Corp., 195 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1999). Other circuits permit splitting
actions into separate mandatory and opt-out classes (so-called "hybrid" actions). See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 166-68 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The
Class Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in refusing to bifurcate the pattern-or-practice
claim and certify the liability stage of the claim for (b)(2) class treatment.... We agree."), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 951 (2002); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807,812 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e
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Notwithstanding the disarray in this area of the law and the absence of any
controlling Fifth Circuit authority,74 in Crystian, the district court certified a
mandatory, non-opt-out class under Rule 23 (b)(1)(A) over the objection of over
1200 class members, many of whom had filed individual actions for money
damages. 75 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's certification order in
a brief, unpublished, per curiam opinion that does not cite, let alone address,
relevant authorities.76 The upshot of the court's ruling is to strip objecting class
members of any right to disassociate from the class and independently pursue
their damages claims. And because the panel designated the opinion as
unpublished, the petition for rehearing en banc filed by the objecting class
members was all but doomed, as was their petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.77
conclude that the plaintiff class's damages claim predominates over its claim for equitable relief
such that the district court abused its discretion by not exempting the damages claim from class
treatment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2)."); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir.
1997) ("[T]he court may adopt a 'hybrid' approach, certifying a (b)(2) class as to the claims for
declaratory or injunctive relief, and a (b)(3) class as to claims for monetary relief.... ."). In
marked contrast, several circuits encourage mandatory, non-opt-out class certification even
when damages claims are present. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388,393 (3d Cir.
1981) ("We therefore agree... that an action maintainable under both (b)(2) and (b)(3) should
be treated under (b)(2) to enjoy its superior res judicata effect and to eliminate the procedural
complications of(b)(3) which serve no useful purpose under (b)(2)."); In re A.H. Robins Co.,
880 F.2d 709, 728 (4th Cir. 1989) ("If an action can be maintained under (b)(1) and/or (b)(2),
and also under (b)(3), the court should order that the suit be maintained.., under (b)(1) and/or
(b)(2)... so that the judgment will have resjudicata effect as to all the class .... "), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); First Fed. of Mich. v. Barrow, 878 F.2d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 1989)
("[W]hen class certification would be appropriate under either §§ 23(b)(1) or (b)(3) of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, the former section should control."); DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d
1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1995) ("When either subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2) is applicable, however,
(b)(3) should not be used, so as to avoid unnecessary inconsistencies and compromises in future
litigation."), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1156 (1996).
74. For the only even arguably relevant Fifth Circuit authority, see Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 425 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the "predominance" inquiry
under Rule 23(b)(2) may be met only when the money damages sought "flow directly from
liability to the class as a whole on claims forming the basis of the injunctive or declaratory
relief'). Though the opinion in Smith v. Crystian cites Allison in passing, it did not apply that
test in upholding the district court's certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(A) class. See Smith v.
Crystian, 91 Fed. Appx. 952, 954-55 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Allison to establish the limited
nature of review of a district court's certification of a class action suit), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
972 (2005).
75. See Smith v. Crystian, 91 Fed. Appx. at 954 (finding that the district court's
certification of a mandatory class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was proper).
76. See id. at 955 ("In the instant case, the district court applied the proper standard and
found that the settlement was fair and reasonable.").
77. See Crystian v. Tower Loan of Miss. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 972, 972 (2005) (denying
certiorari). We do not mean to single out the Fifth Circuit for criticism. The Sixth Circuit also
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We cite Crystian because it crystalizes our concerns about unpublished
and uncitable opinions. Here, a panel of the Fifth Circuit was able effectively
to insulate from any review a decision in a highly controversial and unsettled
area of the law affecting the constitutional rights of over a thousand people.78
There can be no plausible claim that Crystian was "routine" or met the criteria
for cases suitable for disposition without a published opinion. Surely it did not
involve the application of settled law to the unique facts of the case; there is no
controlling precedent on the issue in the Fifth Circuit.79 The absence of any
legitimate reason for resolving the case in an unpublished opinion gives rise to
speculation that the panel did so for strategic reasons-perhaps to give a green
light to mandatory, non-opt-out classes, even where the class seeks money
damages, and avoid subjecting that judgment to the probing eyes of their
colleagues on the circuit or the Supreme Court.
80
As our final example, consider the Ninth Circuit's mea culpa in United
States v. Rivera-Sanchez.81 Like other circuits that employ a high volume of
unpublished opinions, the Ninth Circuit takes the view that unpublished
opinions may not be considered precedential because they articulate no new
dodged a difficult class action question by using an unpublished decision to dispose of an
appeal of a major nationwide class action settlement on the ground that the objectors had not
intervened in the action below. See Bowling v. Pfizer, 995 F.2d 1066, 1066 (6th Cir. 1993)
(dismissing the appeal). In its one-sentence order, the Sixth Circuit did not even cite then-
controlling Sixth Circuit law holding that nonintervening objectors had a right to appeal a class
settlement. See, e.g., Sertic v. Cuyahoga, Lake, Geauga & Ashtabula Counties Carpenters Dist.
Council, 459 F.2d 579, 583 (6th Cir. 1972) (concluding that it was an abuse of discretion to
deny an interested class member's intervention in an action concerning the class settlement).
Since then, the Supreme Court has held that a member of a class who objects to a class action
settlement may appeal the district court's approval of the settlement without having first
intervened in the action. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9 (2002) (stating that a "District
Court's approval of the settlement" is sufficient to establish a class member's right to an appeal).
78. See Smith v. Crystian, 91 Fed. Appx. at 956 (affirming all of the district court's
rulings).
79. As noted, supra note 74, our independent research did not uncover any Fifth Circuit
law on the question presented in Smith v. Crystian, let alone a controlling authority.
80. The FJC Preliminary Report confirms that even judges are concerned about the lack of
consistency in circuit law that is the byproduct of unpublished opinions. Of 122 judges
responding to a poll question that asked them to "best describe[] how often an attorney has cited
an unpublished opinion of your court that is inconsistent or difficult to reconciled with a
published opinion of your court," 27% of the responding judges said that cited unpublished
opinions are "occasionally inconsistent," and 3% of the judges said that they were "often" or
"very often" inconsistent. Virtually all judges said that such inconsistency did not occur "often."
See FJC PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 41, at 11 (describing both appellate lawyers' and
circuit judges' reactions to the proposed rule change concerning unpublished opinions).
81. See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming
defendant's conviction for illegal entry into the United States).
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legal standard. 82 But during the argument in Rivera-Sanchez, it became
apparent to the panel that the court had not developed a legal standard to
answer a question left open by the Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres v.
United States.83 Namely, when a district court is faced with a defendant
convicted of illegal re-entry after deportation whose indictment refers to both 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), must the district court re-sentence
the defendant or merely correct the judgment of conviction? 84 Obviously, a
defendant would prefer re-sentencing in the hope that his or her sentence would
be reduced. Nonetheless, after directing the parties to file briefs addressing
unpublished opinions on the point (something that is ordinarily forbidden under
Ninth Circuit rules), it became apparent that the Ninth Circuit had issued no
fewer than twenty "unpublished memorandum decisions taking different
approaches to resolving" the question. 5 The court's resolution of that issue in
Rivera-Sanchez is cold comfort to the criminal defendants whose sentences
potentially hung in the balance.
The question that arises is whether there is any reason to think that we
have done anything but identify a handful of aberrational cases or outliers. We
do not think so for the following reason: The system is set up so that if a case
gets past the staff attorney screening process and receives review by the full
panel of three judges (and their law clerks), the level of scrutiny is so intense
that there should be a zero probability that a case raising important unanswered
questions of law would receive anything but full treatment in a published
opinion. Cases at the margin, where it is unclear whether the issues are really
important, may slide through. But no cases of the sort we identified in our
examples should escape notice. And assuming that they did not escape notice
leaves us with only one conclusion: The judges are intentionally choosing to
duck some inconvenient issues.
Is this a completely implausible scenario? We do not think so. Judges are
under workload pressures. They cannot devote full attention to all their cases.
Inevitably, there are going to be some cases that they prefer to others. For
judges who like leisure, there may be a preference for easier rather than harder
82. See id. at 1062 (noting that this decision meets the requirements for publication
because it "establishes a rule of law that ... [the Ninth Circuit] had not previously announced in
a published decision").
83. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 23 U.S. 224 (1998).
84. See Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d at 1062 (noting that different panels of the Ninth
Circuit have taken "different approaches to resolving" the question left open by the Supreme
Court in Almendarez-Torres).
85. See id. (listing the unpublished opinions that address the issue left open by the
Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres).
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cases. For judges who are seeking the attention of politicians making
promotion decisions, the preference may be for cases that will provide
appropriate signals. For still other judges who want to influence the academy,
the preference may be for cases that will allow for innovative solutions to
complex problems. The list of motivations that might drive judges to prefer
some types of cases to others is nearly endless.8 6 The point is that it is plausible
that judges might seek to duck certain cases so as to give themselves more time
for other cases or activities. To the extent circuits develop norms under which
judges are willing to permit each other to avoid writing published opinions in
distasteful cases, a pattern of systematic sweeping under the rug can arise.
The foregoing drives home our concerns about current restrictions on
publication and citation practices. They stifle development of the law, they
force courts to blind themselves to their own work product, they weaken public
confidence in the fairness of courts, and perhaps most importantly, the no-
citation rules erode the accountability of life-tenured Article III appellate judges
who are subject to few checks on their power other than the watchful oversight
of their colleagues.8 7 These are all points that others at the symposium have
made. We would like to suggest, however, that the analysis needs to take at
least one additional step in terms of examining the potential impact of the
above-identified practices on the incentives of appellate lawyers.
B. Lawyers and Incentives for Strategic Behavior
Sophisticated appellate lawyers have incentives to engage in strategic
behavior-the two track system demands that they do so. For lawyers
representing appellants (or petitioners), the pile on which your client's case is
placed-the Track One argument pile, or the Track Two pile for cases disposed
of summarily without argument-often determines the case's outcome.
Experienced lawyers know the statistics: The chances of obtaining a reversal in
a case selected for summary disposition is insignificant-at most a small
fraction of the chance of obtaining reversal if the case is given plenary review. 8
86. For a discussion about how various judicial motives might affect federal district court
opinions, see Andrew P. Moriss et al., Signaling and Precedent in District Court Opinions, 13
SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 63, 74 (2005) (discussing the process by which a federal district court
judge might craft opinions to signal that he or she is a candidate for promotion).
87. See Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 7, at 1158 (noting the "few, if any, checks on
life tenured judges").
88. According to statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, although
the percentage varies considerably depending on the type of case, civil cases are reversed
approximately 12% of the time and criminal cases are reversed about 5% of the time. ADMiN.
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These lawyers also know that the courts grant oral argument more often in
cases presenting novel and important questions of law rather than mundane
questions of fact, and they have every incentive to shoehorn their appeals into
that mold.
There is no mystery about the kinds of cases in which courts grant oral
argument. Rule 34(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure permits a
court to dispense with argument when "the appeal is frivolous," "the dispositive
issue or issues have been authoritatively decided," or the "decisional process
would not be significantly aided by oral argument." 89 Many circuits have
promulgated local rules or established internal operating procedures that make
clear that argument is generally not granted where "the issue is tightly
constrained, not novel, and the briefs adequately cover the arguments," the
"outcome ... is clearly controlled by a decision of the Supreme Court or this
Court," or the case will be determined by the "state of the record."90 In
contrast, argument is granted where "the appeal presents a substantial and novel
legal question," when the appeal's resolution "will be of institutional or
precedential value," when a "judge has questions to ask of counsel," or when an
"important public interest will be affected."91
These clear-cut (and common-sense) directives on the criteria the courts
use to grant argument-and rightly or wrongly, argument is perceived to be an
essential step in the path to reversal-encourage experienced appellate lawyers
to formulate their appeals in terms that maximize their chance for argument.
As the lawyers see it, they face a Hobson's choice. Consider a case in which
appellate counsel believes that the court below clearly erred in its fact-finding
function and may well have also erred as a matter of law. On one hand, the
lawyer can pursue a relatively weak claim based on alleged legal errors and, by
so doing, increase the chance the case will be given oral argument, so long as
the lawyer can plausibly claim that the legal issues presented are novel or
unsettled in the circuit. On the other hand, the lawyer can pursue a stronger
fact-based claim, but, in so doing, risk sacrificing the chance of having oral
argument. Many appellate lawyers would opt to cast their appeals as presenting
OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.B-5 (2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/contents.html. Although the office does not report the
affirmative rates of unpublished opinions as compared to published ones, it is conventional lore
among experienced litigators that the chance of obtaining a reversal in cases disposed of without
argument by unpublished opinion is slim.
89. See FED. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) (describing the standards for oral arguments).
90. See, e.g., 3D CIR. I.O.P. § 2.4.1. (describing the criteria for oral arguments), available
at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf.
91. Id. at § 2.4.2.
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chiefly legal issues because they take as an article of faith (and the statistics
bear this out) that having oral argument is critical to success on appeal.92 Even
if a lawyer decides to press both issues (and we assume that most would do so),
the lawyer still must decide with which issue to lead, thereby giving that
argument greater prominence.
The lawyer's strategic decision is further complicated by the argument
practices that prevail in each circuit. For example, in some circuits, like the
Second Circuit, oral argument for parties represented by counsel (and even
some pro se litigants) is granted as a matter of routine.93 In other circuits, like
the Fifth and Eleventh, argument is a relative rarity, even for parties represented
by counsel. 94 In those circuits, lawyers know that, in cases in which argument
is granted, Article III judges will be actively involved in reviewing and
deciding the case, even if the appeal is ultimately resolved in an unpublished
opinion. The same is not necessarily true for cases decided without argument.
In those cases, the lawyers and litigants have no idea whether the case will be
handled by Article III judges or by staff counsel or law clerks in a "black box"
process that is opaque to outsiders and may entail only minimal oversight by
Article IH judges. Most lawyers want to avoid the black box, Track Two
process.
There are, in our view, rule of law consequences that flow from this
process. Under the two-track system that is used in many circuits, appellate
lawyers have incentives to frame their briefs (or at least the questions presented
and the statements regarding the necessity for argument) to persuade staff
counsel, law clerks, and judges that the case merits oral argument. This means
that, if the appellate lawyers are able, they will mold their appeals in ways that
present novel or unsettled questions of law, even if they have to reach to do so.
That practice has at least two problematic consequences. First, courts are
systematically asked to resolve questions of law that, under a different system,
would not be presented. And they are often asked to do so in cases that do not
present the legal question in the best light, thus distorting our system of
precedent-development. Exactly what impact that has had on the development
of the law is unknown and perhaps unknowable, but it is a question worth
exploring. Second, and related, the foregoing game-playing opportunities
92. See infra note 133 (presenting statistical information concerning summarily dismissed
cases in the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals).
93. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 157, 223 (1998) (reporting that, in 1998, 61.3% of the cases before the Second Circuit
were granted oral argument).
94. See id. (reporting that, in 1998, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit granted oral argument
in 31.2% and 32.2% of cases respectively).
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magnify the advantages that already accrue to parties represented by counsel,
especially experienced appellate counsel. That too has rule of law implications
that should be explored, especially since, as we discuss later, it appears that
cases involving legal claims by people who cannot afford lawyers constitute a
significant percentage of those cases resolved by unpublished opinion.
95
Is this strategic dilemma common? We believe it is but lack empirical
evidence to support our intuition. Our prediction is that ifjudges favor certain
types of cases more than others and are thereby more likely to look at them
carefully, as opposed to delegating them to staff lawyers, lawyers will use this
information to modify their litigation strategies to maximize their chances of
winning their cases. Those modifications in litigation strategies, in turn, have
an impact on how precedent develops and even on who wins.
The question then is how to test the strategic lawyer hypothesis. The fact
that the circuits vary considerably in their treatment of cases, particularly the
so-called less important cases, helps. The circuits have roughly similar internal
rules that determine what types of opinions should be published-usually
opinions in cases where new precedent will be created. But, as commentators
have pointed out, those internal rules seem to translate into starkly different
publication practices. 96 Consider two hypothetical situations. In the Seventh
Circuit, hypothetically, the judges themselves may be dealing with the majority
of unpublished dispositions.97 In other words, Track One and Track Two may
95. See infra note 133 and accompanying text (claiming that unpublished opinions
dispose disproportionately of cases brought by pro se litigants, prisoners, immigrants, social
security recipients, and the disabled). Professor Pether, interpreting the findings of Professors
Merritt and Brudney, suggests that forum shopping and manipulation of precedent by repeat-
player litigants may result from the inconsistent way with which judges apply publication
criteria. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1495 (citing Merritt & Brudney, supra note 62, at 112-13,
117) (claiming that inconsistent publication criteria encourage forum shopping).
96. See e.g., Merritt& Brudney, supra note 62, at 114 n.131 (discussing the predictors of
publication for courts of appeals decisions); Robert A. Mead, Unpublished Opinions as the Bulk
of the Iceberg: Publication Patterns in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits of the United States
Courts of Appeal, 91 LAw LIRR. J. 589, 607 (2001) (describing the characteristics of cases
resolved by unpublished opinions); Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 93, at 159-60 (describing
the shortcomings of unsigned opinions and the judicial process that produces them). These
differences in publication practices and informal norms seem also to filter down to the district
court level. See Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25
JUST. SYS. J. 121, 121-23 (2004) (discussing the latitude that district courts enjoy in publishing
opinions).
97. While we are unaware of any study that has specifically examined judicial
involvement across the circuits in the drafting of unpublished opinions, it should be possible to
use computational linguistic techniques to do such an examination. See Stephen Choi & Mitu
Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1077 passim (2005) (employing various tests to discover authorship of judicial opinions). In
the course of writing this Article, we examined samples of unpublished dispositions from
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essentially be the same in that both get the full attention of an Article IlI judge.
By contrast, in the Eleventh Circuit, hypothetically, it may be that only the
small subset of cases in which oral argument is granted receive meaningful
attention from an Article III judge. Assuming that these types of stark circuit
differences exist, we predict that different types of briefs will appear in
different circuits.
In the hypothetical Eleventh Circuit scenario described above, the lawyer
who won at the lower court will strive to portray the case as routine, largely
involving factual issues, and unworthy of attention-the assumption being that
unpublished dispositions that get shuttled to the staff lawyers will inevitably be
affirmed. The lawyer on the other side will do the reverse and try to portray
that case as involving complex and precedential issues-creating legal issues
because there is a better chance of winning (that is, obtaining a reversal) if an
Article III judge pays attention to his case. By contrast, in the hypothetical
Seventh Circuit scenario, the judges themselves pay attention even if they are
going to use an unpublished per curiam opinion to dispose of the case.
Accordingly, incentives as to what arguments to make are not skewed by the
need to first pass a screening mechanism that siphons off some large portion of
cases to staff attorneys who almost invariably recommend affirmances and then
have those recommendations rubber stamped. Assuming that these kinds of
differences in publication norms exist across the circuits, we should see
corresponding responses from the lawyers. Lawyers-seeking reversals for
their clients in the Eleventh Circuit, knowing that the first hurdle that they need
to cross is that of making sure that their case reaches a panel of Article III
judges-will invest more effort in suggesting that the case involves important,
precedent-creating legal issues than they would in the Seventh Circuit. Further,
this differential focus should appear more clearly in areas where the subject
matter is presumed, at the outset, to be routine (for example, in cases involving
several circuits. Even our cursory review disclosed signs of stark differences in judges'
participation. Take for instance, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. In the set of Seventh
Circuit dispositions, one sees a wide variation in writing and citation styles. Some opinions
even seem to bear the mark of a particular judge such as Frank Easterbrook or Richard Posner,
each of whom has a distinctive writing style. The Eleventh Circuit unpublished dispositions, by
contrast, are generally brief, formulaic, and dominated by stock phrases explaining the court's
decision to affirm such as: "because our independent review of the entire record reveals no
arguable issues of merit," and "[w]e find no reversible error in the district court's
determination." See, e.g., United States v. Perry, No. 04-12065, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15923,
at *919 (11 th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005) (disposing of case with brief and general language); United
States v. Crockett, No. 04-15109, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15668, at *915 (1 1th Cir. July 28,
2005) (same); United States v. Garces, No. 04-15112, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15653, at *916
(11 th Cir. July 28,2005) (same); Ophthalmic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Geller, No. 05-11305,2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15377, at *910 (1 1th Cir. July 27, 2005) (same).
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Social Security appeals as contrasted with cases involving First Amendment
issues-with the latter set of cases presumed to involve important issues).
Finally, we should also expect that these signs of strategic behavior will show
up more in the briefs of the elite appellate lawyers-those used to gaming the
system for even the smallest of advantages-than in the briefs of the more
98
ordinary practitioners.
III. The Perils of Judicial Triage
The dispute over nonprecedential and noncitable opinions has proceeded
as if it were hermetically sealed off from a larger and even more intractable
problem-the rise of the caseload of our appellate courts without a
commensurate increase in judicial resources. 99 As noted, judges are among the
staunchest defenders of the restrictive publication rules they have developed
and implemented. 1°° As many judges see it, they have no choice, and people
who do not share their views misconceive the gravity of the docket-
management problems judges face.'01 The judges have a point. The enormity
of appellate caseloads precludes judges from giving each case the sort of
individualized attention that we presume is the hallmark of appellate justice, let
alone from issuing an opinion of publishable quality, written by an Article 1H
judge, in every case.
98. There is the practical question of how to conduct a meaningful comparison of lawyer
strategies in the different circuits. One method would be to evaluate the briefs themselves,
perhaps starting with those in a few subject areas. A less painstaking and more direct method
might be to interview the lawyers themselves. While we suspect that these appellate lawyers
may not be willing to give meaningful answers on a survey, in-depth interviews might work.
Ideally, of course, one would combine the quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry,
which is something that we are in the process of attempting.
99. Cases have risen over 300% in the last thirty years. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 9 tbl. 1.1 (2005) [hereinafter JUDICIAL FACTS AND
FIGURES] (setting forth the number of appeals filed from 1988 through 2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/alljfftables.pdf. The number of judges has
increased marginally but not commensurately with the rise in the caseload. See id. at 13 tbl. 1.3
(setting forth the number of authorized judgeships from 1960 through 2004).
100. See, e.g., Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 11, at 43-44 (defending the use of
unpublished opinions); see also Schiltz Memorandum, supra note 35, at 17-19 (noting that the
most ardent opposition to the proposed rule comes from court of appeals judges); Penelope
Pether, Take a Letter, Your Honor: Outing the Judicial Epistemology ofHart v. Massanari, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1553, 1592-93 (2005) (citing judicial support for unsigned opinions).
101. See Shiltz, Explaining the Sturm Und Drang, supra note 1, at 1475-80 (describing
judicial objections to citation rules).
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The numbers tell the story. At present,,there are 167 authorized full-time
circuit judges, excluding the twelve judges authorized for the Federal Circuit.' 02
That number has grown over the decades, from 97 in 1970, to 132 in 1980, to
the current 167 in 1995.103 For a variety of reasons, many judicial vacancies
have gone unfilled for years, resulting in the number of sitting judges being
generally fewer than the number of authorized judges. While the number of
appellate judgeships has less than doubled over the past thirty years or so, the
volume of appellate cases has risen far faster, moving from 11,662 in 1970 to
34,292 in 1986, to 48,322 in 1994, and to over 60,000 in 2002 (excluding the
Federal Circuit).1 4 To be sure, as a stop gap, circuits can draw on the services
of senior judges and district court judges. But there is no dispute that the
caseloads of the courts of appeals have grown to the point where notions of
individualized judicial attention to each appeal are antiquated and unrealistic.
Perhaps the best way to understand the impact of the explosive caseload
growth is to view it from the vantage point of a circuit judge. Take the Ninth
Circuit. In 2002, that court disposed of 492 cases per active judge.'0 5
Assuming judges can reasonably devote 2000 hours a year to the task of
judging (an assumption that puts to one side the myriad other responsibilities
Article III appellate judges shoulder), a judge would have around four hours
per case-four hours to read the briefs and record, to discuss the case with law
clerks and colleagues, to hear oral argument, to decide in conference how to
resolve the case, and to draft an opinion. That calculation does not include any
time for the judge to participate in the consideration of the nearly 1000 other
cases on which the judge would sit, where responsibility for drafting the
opinion would be shouldered by a colleague. Nor does that calculation take
into account the time spent drafting concurring or dissenting opinions. Given
the complexity of the cases pending before our appellate courts, the idea that
cases can reasonably be adjudicated in a few hours is a nonstarter. 10 6 And the
102. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2004) (setting forth the number of full-time circuit judges); see
also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 51 (5th ed. 2003) (setting forth the number of authorized judgeships).
103. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 76 tbl.6.
104. JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 17, at tbl. 1.3.
105. Hon. Alex Kozinski, The Appearance ofPropriety, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at
19. Judge Kozinski is referring to dispositions on the merits per active judge; he is not taking
into account appeals dismissed for procedural reasons. See id. at 19 (referring to cases decided
on the merits). In 1970, there were about 130 appeals per judgeship; by 1995 the number had
grown to 297. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 157.
106. See Charles A. Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial
Administration, 42 TEx. L. REv. 949, 957 (1964) (arguing that no federal appeals court judge
could handle more than eighty cases per year with reasonable efficiency).
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Ninth Circuit was far from the busiest court of appeals; the Eleventh Circuit
had that honor, with 843 cases per active judge. 10 7 That would translate into
less than two and a half hours per case.
Judges cannot do the impossible. To address this crushing caseload, it is
unsurprising that courts have developed tracking systems to differentiate among
cases. 10 8 There are, of course, those who believe that more sweeping structural
reforms are needed. And much thought has been given to find ways to permit
appellate courts to better cope with their growing workloads. The Federal
Courts Study Committee, appointed by the Chief Justice at the direction of
Congress, issued a comprehensive set of recommendations in 1990.109 These
recommendations were, for the most part, embraced by the Committee on Long
Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1995.110 The
solutions advocated by these committees were far-reaching and involved highly
political decisions that are the province of Congress, not the courts, to make.
Among their proposals were ones to:
4" Curtail diversity jurisdiction;'1
o. Impose other restrictions on the subject-matter jurisdiction of
federal courts;1 '
2
4o Expand the size of the federal appellate judiciary to correspond to
the increase in the appellate caseload;" 13
107. Kozinski, supra note 105, at 19.
108. Although Judge Kozinski defends the practice of devoting a disproportionate amount
of judicial time to the big cases, even though it means "giv[ing] short shrift to small ones," he
acknowledges the complexity of determining the category into which a case falls. See Kozinski,
supra note 105, at 19 ("[H]ow close a look [to a case] any judges actually takes is strictly a
matter of conscience."). As he put it, "I have found no way to separate the sheep from the goats,
except by taking a close look at each case." Id.
109. See generally FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE [hereinafter STUDY COMMrTEE REPORT] (recommending solutions to the "mounting
public and professional concern with federal courts' congestion, delay, expense, and
expansion").
110. See generally COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR TE FEDERAL COURTS (2d prtg. 1995) (presenting a plan that
will allow courts to adapt to the "accelerating pace of social changes").
111. Id. at 27-32; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 89-93.
112. See, e.g., Hon. Jon 0. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to
Preserve the Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHIL L. REv. 761,770-77 (1989) (arguing that cases
"should not be assigned or barred from federal courts by entire categories," but judges should
use discretion to determine whether cases "within designated categories may proceed to federal
court"); see generally STUDY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 109.
113. On occasion, Congress has reviewed proposals to increase significantly the number of
active appellate court judges. However, sitting Article III judges have staunchly opposed these
proposals. See FALLON, supra note 102, at 49-50 (providing statistics for federal caseloads and
discussing suggestions to fix the problem of an overextended judiciary); Hon. Jon 0. Newman,
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I. Increase the use of alternative dispute resolution programs; l4 and
1'o Create Article I courts to handle entire categories of cases, mostly
involving fact-intensive disputes over individual rights
(discrimination, immigration, and social security cases were
commonly mentioned). 1 5
What is significant here is that none of these proposals commanded a
political consensus. All were controversial; all had their detractors; none bore
fruit. Indeed, despite the efforts of these committees and others to curtail
federal jurisdiction, Congress has headed in the opposite direction by adding to,
not subtracting from, the workload of federal courts. And judges are not
helping matters-many of them resist reform proposals such as those that
would increase the number ofjudges."16 Over time, enthusiasm for sweeping,
"cure all" approaches to reforming the federal courts appears to have died
1,000 Federal Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187, 187-
88 (1993) (arguing that 1000 judges at the federal level is the maximum number that will allow
the federal judiciary to remain efficient and effective). But see Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, Whose
Federal Judiciary Is ItAnyway?, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1, 6 (1993) (suggesting that the number
of federal judges should be increased in order to provide better access to the courts for all
citizens). Those who support the broad expansion of the federal judiciary dismiss the judges'
objections by arguing that they are "elitists" trying to preserve the exclusivity of their small club.
See Richman & Reynolds, New Certiorari, supra note 4, at 339-40 (arguing that the restricted
size of the federal judiciary impedes citizens' access to the courts); see also Michael Wells,
Against an Elite Federal Judiciary: Comments on the Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee, 1991 BYU L. REv. 923, 933-46 (offering objections to the Federal Courts Study
Committee report endorsing the maintenance of an elite federal judiciary). To be sure, Article
III judges have long been the fiercest critics of proposals to expand dramatically their ranks.
Nevertheless, sound reasons exist to keep the federal bench small, and Congress has shown no
appetite to grapple with this question. For an insightful and comprehensive examination of the
role the judiciary has played in helping determine the optimal number of judges, see Judith
Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113
HARV. L. REV. 924, 983-95 (2000).
114. See, e.g., Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, 166 F.R.D. 49, 130 (1996).
115. See STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 55-66, 74-81 (arguing that
bankruptcy, parole hearings, and employment claims should be adjudicated in Article I courts,
as should discrimination, immigration, and social security cases). One could argue that given
the high percentage of these cases disposed of by unpublished, noncitable opinions drafted
mainly by staff attorneys and not judges, the courts have already accomplished this end by
judicial fiat. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1436 n.5, 1444 n.30 (noting that the real reason
unpublished opinions have become so prevalent might be the increase in individual rights cases,
and citing the remarks of Judge Margaret McKeown, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, at a January 2001 panel presentation held by the Association of American Law
Schools) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
116. See supra note 113 (discussing Article In judges' opposition to increasing the number
of judges); see also Paul D. Carrington, Checks and Balances: Congress and the Judiciary
n. 183 (unpublished draft, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Resnik, supra
note 18, at 602-05 (discussing the demand for additional judges).
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down. Courts are conservative institutions and, if history is a guide, reform will
come slowly and incrementally. Thus, we assume that the current system of
resolving cases, for better or worse, will endure for the foreseeable future. We
therefore turn briefly to our thoughts for examining and perhaps improving the
two-track system that is in place today.
IV. Questions for the Courts
This paradigm shift in the way courts of appeals consider and decide cases
raises questions for the judiciary--questions that have not received the attention
they warrant. For one thing, embedded questions of procedure remain: Should
courts openly acknowledge that we now have two distinct and very different
tiers of appellate justice in the United States? Is it right that judges now rely
heavily on staff counsel to do the heavy lifting in deciding significant numbers
of cases? Should we move to a system that explicitly acknowledges the limited,
supervisory role judges play in the disposition of these cases? Most critically,
have the burdens on appellate courts reached the point where Congress should
consider the creation of a permanent corps of professional assistants to Article
I court of appeals judges? (Such assistants could fill a role modeled on that of
the magistrate judge in district court litigation, with appointment for a term of
years and formal, open participation in the disposition of routine appeals.)
Part of the concern over restrictive publication practices stems from the
mystery that enshrouds the process of deciding Track Two cases. These case-
resolving processes have evolved out of public sight. Apart from the antiseptic
and cursory descriptions in the circuit handbooks and internal operating
procedure guides, the courts have done little to explain to litigants and the bar
what goes on behind the scenes. In most circuits, little is made public about
how and when cases are culled from the pool and designated as cases to be
decided without argument and without a published opinion, how unpublished
opinions are produced, who writes them, and to what extent the process is
overseen by judges. These are all fair inquiries. The authority of courts is not
enhanced by cloaking this process in fog.
One insight into the workings of this process was provided by Judge
Kozinski. Judge Kozinski has written that his court's practice of disposing of
Track Two cases raises "one of the embedded ethical issues that no one ever
talks about."" 17 He describes the process as follows:
117. Kozinski, supra note 105, at 19.
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Ninth Circuit judges generally have four law clerks, and the circuit
shares approximately 70 staff attorneys, who process roughly 40 percent of
the cases in which we issue a merits ruling. When I say process, I mean
that they read the briefs, review the record, research the law, and prepare a
proposed disposition, which they then present to a panel of three judges
during a practice we call "oral screening"-oral, because the judges don't
see the briefs in advance, and because they generally rely on the staff
attorney's oral description of the case in deciding whether to sign on to the
proposed disposition. After you decide a few dozen such cases on a
screening calendar, your eyes glaze over, your mind wanders, and the urge
to say O.K. to whatever is put in front of you becomes almost irresistible.
Judge Edith Jones describes the Fifth Circuit's practice in similar,
although less colorful, terms:
Case management has become integral to the operation of the appellate
courts. Appeals are processed on different tracks, depending on such
criteria as whether they were filed pro se or whether they present 'routine,'
as opposed to novel, issues. Simply to keep up with the volume of appeals,
growing components of which are cases filed by prisoners and direct
criminal appeals, courts have had to employ staff attorneys rather than
leaving initial review to individual judges. Staff attorneys often take
primary responsibility for reviewing the trial court record, assessing the
issues presented, and preparing memoranda that can readily be transformed
into unpublished or published opinions.' 1 9
Apparently, most circuits now use staff attorneys or other judicial
assistants to "process" nonargument cases by reviewing the briefs and records,
analyzing the legal issues, and presenting the judges with memoranda setting
forth their appraisals of the cases along with proposed dispositions. 120  It
118. Id. at 19-20; see also NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ORDERS 6.5(b)(i)
(2005) (defining case-screening procedure). The Ninth Circuit's formal procedure is as follows:
The staff attorneys shall orally present the proposed dispositions to the screening
panels at periodically scheduled sessions. After the staff attorneys have presented
each case, the panel members discuss the proposed disposition and make any
necessary revisions. Disposition of cases presented at the oral screening and
motions panel ordinarily will be by unpublished memorandum or order.
Id.
119. Hon. Edith Jones, Back to the FutureforFederal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal
Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (1995) (reviewing
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
(1994)).
120. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 62, at 79 ("Many circuits use staff clerks to
prepare memoranda disposing of certain cases; those memoranda are less likely to be published
than opinions prepared in a judge's chambers. Staff in many circuits also screen cases for oral
argument, exerting substantial influence over which cases ultimately generate published
opinions."). See also Joe Cecil & Donna Stienstra, Deciding Cases Without Argument: An
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appears that apart from the sort of"supervision" Judge Kozinski describes, in
some circuits there is little participation by Article III judges in these
dispositions, other than making sure that the dispositions are correct.1 21
Although few statistics are available, it appears that judges rarely disagree
with proposed dispositions and that, as the number of unpublished decisions
increases, the level of judicial involvement in them may be waning.122
Consider the directly related question of"authorship.' ' 23 Some circuits,
Examination of Four Courts of Appeal, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (1987), available at 1987
WL 123661 (noting that both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits rely heavily on staff attorneys in
processing cases decided without a published opinion). The D.C. Circuit's Handbook of
Practice and Internal Procedures also acknowledges that its staff attorneys screen cases and, at
times, recommend cases for disposition without argument. In those cases, "the staff attorney
also proposes a disposition, embodied in a draft judgment and, where appropriate, an
accompanying memorandum." See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIR., HANDBOOK OF
PRACTICE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES 31 (2005), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/
internet/internet.nsf/Content/Court+Rules.
121. One scholar described another judge's view of the Ninth Circuit's practices of
preparing unpublished opinions in these terms:
Most are drafted by law clerks with relatively few edits from the judges. Fully 40
percent of our [unpublished opinions] are in screening cases, which are prepared by
our central staff. Every month, three judges meet with the staff attorneys who
present us with the briefs, records, and proposed [dipositions] in 100 to 150
screening cases. If we unanimously agree that the case can be resolved without oral
argument, we make sure the result is correct, but we seldom edit the [unpublished
opinion], much less rewrite it from scratch.
William T. Hangley, Opinions Hidden, Citations Forbidden: A Report & Recommendations of
the American College of Trial Lawyers on the Publication & Citation of Nonbinding Federal
Circuit Court Opinions, 208 F.R.D. 645, 651 (2002).
122. Compare Cecil & Stienstra, supra note 120, at 84 (estimating in 1987 that in the
Ninth Circuit, 10% to 20% of the cases selected by staff attorneys to be disposed of without
argument were reclassified by the judges) with FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE GUIDE: NINTH
CIRcUrr 2D (2004) (estimating that, as of 2004, fewer than 5% of the dispositions selected by
Ninth Circuit staff attorneys were reclassified by the judges).
123. That unpublished opinions are orphaned at birth is telling.. The prevailing practice is
for judges to sign not only the opinions they author but also to indicate the portions of opinions
they author in complex cases where more than one judge participates in drafting the opinion.
See, e.g., Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1277 n.1 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (per curium) (identifying which judge drafted each section of the opinion). The fact that
no one judge is willing to assume responsibility for these decisions suggests that no one judge
played an integral role in their consideration and disposition. On the other hand, courts owe it
to litigants, lawyers, and lower courts to provide some explanation for their rulings. Thus,
courts have gravitated towards the brief, relatively formulaic, unpublished, nonprecedential, per
curiam opinion that states the result and, on occasion, provides a brief explanation and little
more.
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like the Fifth, 124 Sixth, 12  Ninth,1 26 and D.C. 127 Circuits, explicitly
acknowledge the substantial role staff attorneys play in screening cases and in
preparing proposed dispositions for the court. The other circuits, the First,
128
Second, Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, are silent on what role, if
any, staff attorneys play in the disposition of the court's cases. It may be that,
in those circuits, staff counsel play no significant role in case disposition. But,
given the high volume of unpublished decisions in every circuit and especially
the Eleventh, that seems unlikely. That judicial assistants and not judges may
be the principal authors of these opinions plainly has bearing on whether we
ought to know more about these assistants than we currently know. Who are
they? Who hires them? How long do they serve? What kinds of political
biases do they tend to have? What career trajectories do they follow? Are
these career positions for those jaded by the world of practice and client
interaction, or are they two or three year stints that position the staff attorney to
move to other endeavors? We consider all of these legitimate questions given
the gravity of the work these public servants perform. Article III judges are
vetted through an exhaustive process that examines every facet of their
124. See 5TH CIR. COURT OF APPEALS, RULES AND INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 24-
25 (2004) (setting forth a section entitled "Screening," which acknowledges that staff attorneys
screen cases to see whether they warrant oral argument and draft proposed opinions).
125. See 6TH CIR. R. 34(e) ("The staff attorney section reviews this Court's docket to
identify cases which offer the possibility of decision without oral argument... [and] prepare
brief legal research memoranda for any cases so identified and submit them, together with all
briefs filed by the parties, to a hearing panel.").
126. See 9TH CIR. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ORDERS 6.5(b)(i) (2005) (acknowledging
that staff counsel assist in screening cases and draft proposed dispositions for the court).
127. See D.C. CIR. COURT OF APPEALS, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES 49 (2002) (acknowledging that staff attorneys screen new appeals). The D.C.
Circuit's handbook states:
When a staff attorney screens a new appeal and concludes that Rule 34(j)
[disposition without argument] treatment may be appropriate, that screening
recommendation goes to the Clerk's Office, and a briefing schedule (but no oral
argument date) is set. The staff attorney then reviews the briefs, and if he or she
concludes that the case should be disposed of without oral argument, the staff
attorney recommends to the special panel that it decide the case on the merits,
pursuant to the Rule. The staff attorney also proposes a disposition, embodied in a
draft judgment and, where appropriate, an accompanying memorandum.
Id.
128. The First Circuit's rules say only that "initially, the staff attorney reviews the briefs in
the cases the Clerk has assigned for a particular session. If a panel of 3 judges, in accordance
with Fed. R. App. P. 34 and after consultation with the staff attorney, is of the opinion that a
case does not warrant oral argument, the Clerk so advises Counsel." 1ST CIR. COURT OF
APPEALS, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 4 (2005), available at http://www.cal.uscourts.
gov/files/rules/iop.pdf.
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professional lives. 129 Should the public know more about the backgrounds of
the staff attorneys who now play a pivotal role in the administration of appellate
justice in the United States? 130
Consider as well the question of what types of cases fall into Track Two.
What criteria, if any, are used to make that determination? As noted above,
most circuits explain what criteria are used to decide whether to grant oral
argument and what cases warrant disposition by published decisions. These
criteria all go to whether the case presents a novel or unsettled question of law.
Nothing in the materials published by the circuits answers basic questions about
the makeup of these cases. Are Track Two cases a fair cross-section of the
court's docket? Or are cases brought by pro se litigants, prisoners, immigrants,
social security recipients, and the disabled disproportionately represented?
31
From all available evidence, it appears that cases of this sort make up the lion's
129. See generally Stephanie K. Seymour, Remarks: The Judicial Appointment Process:
How Broken Is It?, 39 TULSA L. REv. 691 (2004); David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The
Utility of Empirical Measurements in Judicial Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1415 (2005).
130. The recent FJC Preliminary Report sheds no light on the authorship question. There
are a number of statements from unidentified judges in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that
support the idea that many unpublished opinions are written by staff counsel with little judicial
supervision. FJC PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 41, at 84-90. For instance, one Seventh
Circuit judge commented that if"attorneys were allowed to cite unpublished orders... it would
immeasurably increase the amount of time spent by judges in reviewing the draft orders of staff
law clerks, who do not usually operate under the direct supervision of a judge." Id. at 84. A
Seventh Circuit judge also noted that "[iln our circuit, staff attorneys prepare routine drafts that
judges approve but do not research or write. These definitely should not be available for
citation." Id. at 86. A Ninth Circuit judge acknowledged that "[a]bout one-half of our
unpublished dispositions are written by central staff attorneys (not elbow clerks). Judges review
them minimally, mostly for result. That practice could not be maintained [if the noncitation rule
were jettisoned]." Id. at 88. A Ninth Circuit judge also suggested that "dispositions that come
out of our screening panels in large volume are essentially right as to result, but somewhat short
on reasoning." Id. at 89. The judge added that "I have much less confidence in whatever
reasoning does appear" in those opinions than in opinions drafted by judges. Id.
131. This is not an idle concern. Another distinguished Ninth Circuit Judge, Margaret
McKeown, has suggested that the practice of issuing unpublished opinions was in part a
response to the flood of pro se prisoners' rights cases brought in the 1960s. Judge McKeown
says there was concern that "the Federal Courts were going to drown under this increasing
volume and that was the real reason that some of these were going to be shunted aside to
unpublished opinions." Pether, supra note 7, at 1444 n.30 (citing the remarks of Judge
Margaret McKeown, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, at a January 2001
panel presentation held by the Association of American Law Schools) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Excluding the Federal Circuit, for the twelve month period
ending on September 30, 2004, there were 62,762 appeals, of which 26,800 (about 40%) were
pro se. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 JUDICIAL BUSINESS tbl.5-4 [hereinafter 2004
JUD. Bus.], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/tables/s4.pdf. Ofthose, more than
half(14,530) were brought by prisoners. Id.
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share of the unpublished opinion docket. 13 2 In one unscientific survey, we
looked at the dispositions for one month by the Second, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits to see the kinds of cases those circuits were resolving in unpublished
opinions. Our findings show that the overwhelming majority of the cases
involved immigration matters, criminal appeals, prisoners' rights (including
habeas), and civil rights cases; few of the cases involved commercial disputes
or corporate parties.' 33 What are the implications of a system that appears to
132. See Pether, supra note 7, at 1444 n.30 (finding an increase in the number of pro se
litigants since the 1960s); 2004 Jun. Bus., supra note 131 (providing statistics on the types of
pro se appeals brought to the courts of appeals); Reynolds & Richman, Studying Deck Chairs,
supra note 3, at 1299 n.46 (noting that district court judges devote most of their attention to
these types of cases).
133. Consider first the summary dispositions entered by the Second Circuit during May
2005. During May, the Second Circuit issued unpublished opinions in seventy-four cases:
twenty-seven immigration cases; fifteen criminal cases, including eleven which were remanded
with the government's consent for re-sentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct.
738 (2005); thirteen prisoners' rights cases (including habeas cases); nine civil rights cases; six
commercial or securities cases; two pension fund cases; and two miscellaneous cases. See U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 2D CIR., DECISIONS, http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/ (last visited
Jan. 18, 2006) (providing database of Second Circuit dispositions, searchable by date). Of these
seventy-four cases, and apart from those involving uncontested remands under Booker, only six
cases were not affirmed in their entirety. Id. In two immigration cases, the court vacated in part
decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals, permitting the immigrants to renew claims on
remand. See Markus v. BIA, 131 Fed. Appx. 754, 756 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that applicant's
reasonable opportunity to present evidence was violated when the judge did not allow asylum
applicant's witness to testify); Singh v. Gonzales, 129 Fed. Appx. 663, 666 (2d Cir. 2005)
(finding that the immigration judge erred by relying solely on adverse credibility findings in
denying petitioner's claims without weighing documentary evidence). In two prisoners' rights
cases, the court vacated part of a lower court decision and remanded to permit the prisoner to
attempt to pursue one or more claims. See John v. N.Y. Dep't of Corr., 130 Fed. Appx. 506,
508 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding an abuse of discretion where inmate was not allowed leave to amend
his complaint); Boddie v. Bradley, 129 Fed. Appx. 658, 661 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the
lower court had failed to determine whether petitioner qualified for exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine and whether petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies). In one habeas case,
the court reversed a grant of habeas relief and directed the district court to deny relief. See
Crump v. Reno, 130 Fed. Appx. 500, 501 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act's limitation on eligibility for waiver of deportation applies
retroactively). And in one commercial case, the court vacated and remanded one aspect of the
plaintiff's claim. See 4 Third Ave. Leasehold, LLC v. Permanent Mission of the U.A.E. to the
U.N., 133 Fed. Appx. 768, 770 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding to the lower court for calculation of
attorney's fees).
Consider next the Seventh Circuit. In a one month period, running from May 25, 2005
through June 21, 2005, the court resolved forty-one cases in unpublished opinions: seven
immigration cases; fourteen criminal cases (including four remanded for re-sentencing under
Booker); ten prisoners' rights cases (including habeas and civil rights cases); seven civil rights
cases; two product liability cases; and one Social Security case. Of these, only two (apart from
the Booker remands) were not affirmed in their entirety. In one immigration case, the court
vacated a decision of the Bureau of Immigration Appeals and remanded the case for further
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give certain categories of cases closer attention than others? Are these findings
consistent across the circuits, or are there considerable variations in the kind of
cases circuits select for Track Two treatment? The answers to these questions
would tell us a good deal about the process, yet insofar as we can tell, no circuit
makes this information public.
13 4
There is also a puzzling dissonance between the way caseload burdens
have been addressed in district and appellate courts. The district courts have
also confronted a sharp increase in their caseload. To relieve pressure on
overworked district court judges, Congress expanded both the number of and
the authority conferred on magistrate judges, who now play an integral role in
the disposition of substantial numbers of district court cases, albeit in a formal,
transparent, and highly regimented fashion. 135  Magistrate judges relieve
proceedings. See Tesfahun v. Gonzales, 133 Fed. Appx. 332, 336 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the Board lacked substantial evidence to deny application for asylum). In the second case, the
court vacated a district court ruling that a prisoner had failed to exhaust certain civil rights
claims and remanded the action for consideration of those claims. See Turner v. Huston, 137
Fed. Appx. 880, 883 (vacating petitioner's first four claims and remanding to the lower court).
Finally consider the Tenth Circuit. In May 2005, that court disposed of eighty-five cases in
unpublished opinions. In contrast to both the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Tenth Circuit
disposed of only one immigration case in an unpublished opinion. Sixty criminal and prisoner
cases made up the overwhelming majority of the court's unpublished docket, with twenty-five
criminal cases, four cases involving remands for re-sentencing under Booker, and thirty-one
prisoners' rights cases (including habeas and civil rights). The remaining cases include fourteen
civil rights cases, three commercial cases, and seven miscellaneous cases, including two
involving the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and one each raising
trademark, defamation, bankruptcy, qui tam, and tax claims. Apart from the Booker remands,
only three cases were not affirmed in their entirety. In one case, a conviction was vacated with
the government's consent. See United States v. Isham, 131 Fed. Appx. 641, 641 (10th Cir.
2005) (noting that government conceded that the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction). In another case, the court overturned a district court ruling granting a criminal
defendant's motion to exclude evidence as a sanction for a discovery violation, directing the
district court to find a lesser sanction. See United States v. Ivory, 131 Fed. Appx. 628,632-33
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that the lower court abused its discretion in finding a discovery
violation). In another case, the court granted relief in a prisoner civil rights action that had been
dismissed. See Trapp v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 139 Fed. Appx. 12, 15 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding
that the lower court erred in dismissing the entire complaint for lack of jurisdiction).
134. Others have made the same point. Judge Wald urged ten years ago that there should
be:
periodic overviews of which kinds of cases get sent down one track rather than
another. Danger signals include the presence of obviously difficult issues or the
predominance of certain kinds of cases (for example § 1983 prisoner cases) on one
track, inconsistencies between published and unpublished results and rationales,
and widely differing rates of published and unpublished opinions among different
judges.
Wald, supra note 62, at 1376.
135. Congress first authorized the use of magistrate judges in 1968 and, in a series of
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significant pressure on the district courts, but there is no pretense about their
role; no questions about accountability; and no confusion as to whether it is the
magistrate judge, district judge, or someone else who is the responsible
decision-maker. To be sure, as non-Article HI judges, there are strict limits on
what tasks magistrate judges may perform. But even recognizing that their
powers are circumscribed, the substantial increase in the number of magistrate
judges has permitted overburdened district courts to cope tolerably well with a
caseload burden that would otherwise be intolerable.
There needs to be more creative thinking on how to provide assistance to
overburdened courts. Should thought be given to formalizing and expanding
the role of judicial assistants? Should Congress look to the magistrate judge
model for courts of appeals and use "appellate" magistrate judges to
participate-formally and openly-in the initial disposition of routine appeals
(putting aside the vexing question of what appeals, if any, are routine) or to
provide other assistance to Article Ill appellate judges?
One question is why there has been no consideration to giving appellate
courts similar support. One can easily imagine a system of magistrate appellate
judges appointed to assist court of appeals judges. Just as in the district court,
litigants could opt to have their cases heard in the first instance by a panel of
magistrate judges, with some form of limited review available to the court. In
our view, one real test of whether a case is sensibly relegated to Track Two
would be whether the parties would agree to having their appeal heard by a
panel of magistrate judges rather than Article IH circuit judges. As in the
district court, there would be incentives to encourage parties to make that
choice. Foremost among the incentives would be the promise that the cases
would be heard by far-less burdened judges who could give each case
individual attention, perhaps hear argument, decide each case more quickly
and possibly do so in a less formal and expensive procedure (perhaps the
parties would dispense with the production of ajoint appendix and instead rely
on the record below). In cases in which the principal question presented is not
a novel question of law, but is instead whether the lower court properly applied
enactments, expanded their authority to hear, determine, and enter final judgment in both jury
and nonjury civil cases with all parties' consent. See FED. R. Civ. P. 73 (2000) (delineating a
magistrate judge's powers in civil cases); 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2000) (setting forth magistrate
judges' jurisdiction and powers). Magistrate judges also have the power to conduct pretrial
criminal proceedings and to try criminal misdemeanor cases with the defendant's consent. See
FALLON, supra note 102, at 48 (discussing the expanding role of magistrate judges). In 2001,
there were 471 full-time and 59 part-time magistrate judges, who disposed of more than 850,000
judicial matters. Id.; see also ADMiN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTs, 2001 JUDICIAL BUsINESS 36
tbl.14 (providing statistics related to the federal courts of appeals in 2001), available at
http:www.uscourts.gov/judbus200l/front/2001 artext.pdf.
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settled law to the facts of the case, it may not matter to the parties whether
review is afforded by magistrate judges or Article III judges. 36
Our purpose here is not to suggest that a magistrate-like system should be
engrafted into our appellate system. The point is more modest-namely, that if
the resource problems that are dogging our appellate courts are so intense that
they have prompted the development of these black box systems to resolve
large numbers of cases, perhaps the time has come to adopt more formal and
more transparent mechanisms to relieve courts of some of their burden.
Finally, there is question about outcomes that should be explored as well.
Most cases decided without argument in unpublished opinions affirm lower
court or agency rulings. 137  There are of course a number of plausible
explanations for this high affirmance rate. One explanation could be that high
affirmance rates demonstrate that the tracking system works as intended-it
effectively screens out those cases that do not require intensive judicial
attention because the disposition below is clearly correct. On the other hand,
there may be two less benign explanations. First, affirmance rates are high
because staff attorneys have overwhelming caseloads and may not see an error
in the disposition below unless the error is glaring. Second, affirmance rates
are high as a matter of default because to do anything else would require more
work and the commitment of scarce judicial resources that are better spent
elsewhere. Even though this concern has been raised routinely,1 38 there are no
data that provide any answers.
136. Those who are skeptical that litigants might rationally make such a choice should
examine the district court referral procedures which permit parties to opt to have their case
proceed before a magistrate judge in lieu of a district court judge. See FED. R. Civ. P. 73 (2000)
(setting forth a magistrate judge's powers in civil cases); 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (2000) (setting
forth a magistrate judge's term of appointment, duties, and powers). As the statistics cited
above make clear, parties often choose to have their case heard by a magistrate judge, especially
in backlogged district courts where it might be a year or more before a case could otherwise
come to trial. See FALLON, supra note 102, at 48 (setting forth statistics that show that a
substantial number of cases are handled by magistrate judges).
137. See United States v. Maynard, 97 Fed. Appx. 439,440-41 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming
the lower court's upward departure from guidelines); Redd v. Sailor, 37 Fed. Appx. 76, 76 (4th
Cir. 2002) (dispensing with argument and affirming the lower court); Ortiz v. INS, 230 F.3d
1363, 1363 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming lower court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction).
138. See, e.g., Peter Schuck & E. Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 985-86 (1990) (raising the issue
over fifteen years ago). Professors Schuck and Elliott were attempting to analyze the impact of
Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), on
agency review cases, but were struck by the fact that at that time, 60% of agency review cases
were resolved by unpublished opinions that were reported in a table in Federal Reporter Second.
See id. at 1055 (discussing the effects of the increase in unpublished decisions). As they
pointed out:
The dramatically increased use of table [unpublished] dispositions may reflect an
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V. Conclusion
Embedded in the controversy over publication practices is a problem of far
greater dimension: the workload burdens on our federal appellate courts have
grown to the point where something must be done or else the published opinion
will become a statistical anomaly. That result would serve no one.
Nonetheless, the legal establishment focuses on the publication question and
leaves unattended the more threatening problem of caseload overload. Federal
courts and civil procedure courses seldom make mention of the two track
system of appellate justice in our federal courts, and most academics are barely
aware (if that) that this problem exists. And Congress, almost predictably, has
responded by failing to provide additional resources to the judiciary,
notwithstanding the clear resource deficit facing the courts. Instead, Congress
continues blindly to place new burdens on the courts. 1
39
Perhaps it is the duty of all symposia participants to plant the seeds of a
return invitation. But we believe that until solutions are found for the resource
burdens plaguing our appellate courts, debates over publication practices will
persist and become even more intense. It is time to address the root cause of
the problem and not just one symptom.
increase in affirmances caused by other factors; in this view, table decisions are
simply a less time-consuming way to clear judicial dockets than writing full
published opinions. On the other hand, the increased use of table decisions may be
a cause of a higher affirmance rate, rather than (or as well as) an effect. In this
view, docket considerations motivate reviewing courts to dispose of cases
summarily, and summary dispositions can be accomplished most readily through
affirmance by table decision rather than reversal, remand, or affirmance by written
opinion.
Id. at 1055.
139. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005)
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (amending class action procedures to permit class
actions brought in state court and not otherwise removable to be removed to federal court where
amount in controversy exceeds five million dollars).
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